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ARGUING FOR MORE PRINCIPLED DECISION
MAKING IN DECIDING WHETHER AN
INDIVIDUAL IS SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITED IN
THE MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITY OF WORKING
UNDER THE ADA
Reed L. Russell'
In 1990, Congress passed and President Bush signed the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA or Act).1 The Act generally extends to the
private sector the scope of protection for disabled persons originally pro-
vided to federally funded programs or activities by the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.2 The stated purpose of the ADA is nothing less than to
eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals.3 More specifically,
Congress wanted to increase the employment opportunities for persons
with disabilities and, as a consequence, remove from the welfare system
disabled persons who were willing and able to work.4 To achieve this
+ J.D. candidate, May 1999, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination based on disability by any
program receiving federal financial assistance, any executive agency, and the United
States Postal Service). The Rehabilitation Act also extended protection to federal em-
ployees and employees of federal contractors. See id. §§ 791, 793.
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 2 (1989) (stating that the
purpose of the Act is to eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals and to bring
them into the "economic and social mainstream of American life").
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8)-(9); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 9 (citing the Lou Harris
Poll which found that while a majority of disabled persons are out of the labor force and
on government or other financial assistance, they possess a desire to be self-sufficient);
Arlene Mayerson, The Americans with Disabilities Act-An Historic Overview, 7 LAB.
LAW. 1, 8 (1991) (arguing that the ADA represents a shift in perspective from one in
which society saw a disabled person as someone requiring care and protection to a vision
of the disabled as "active, contributing members" who need civil rights protections to en-
sure full societal participation); see also Tracy L. Hart, Legislative Note, The Americans
with Disabilities Act Title P Equal Employment Rights for Disabled Americans, 18 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 921, 921 (1993) (arguing that the ADA was passed to reduce the waste
of federal assistance on disabled persons who are willing and able to work); cf. Jacobus
tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CAL. L. REV. 809,
810 (1966) (arguing that the medieval and early modern view of the disabled as "'legiti-
mate' beggars" has carried over to modern society, manifested in the perspective that the
disabled are "unemployable[]"). Hart also argues that workplace accommodations that
facilitate the productivity of disabled individuals are significantly less expensive than
workers' compensation, thus providing additional savings. See Hart, supra, at 921-22.
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purpose, the Act broadly defines the term disability to include not only
those currently disabled, but also those with a record of disability and
those who are regarded as disabled by their employers.5
The Act contains a definition of disability similar to that in the Reha-
bilitation Act.' Regulations promulgated by the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (now the Department of Health and Human
Services) define a "handicapped person" as "any person who has a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more ma-
jor life activities, "a record of [such impairment]," or "is regarded as
having [such impairment]. 7 Congress intended that the analysis used to
implement the "individual with handicaps" portion of the Rehabilitation
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C). The "record of" disability provision covers
those individuals who no longer suffer from an impairment, but who previously were sub-
stantially limited in a major life activity or were misclassified as such. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(k) (1997). The basis for inclusion of the "record of" provision was to eliminate
discrimination against those who were previously disabled and continue to suffer the
"stigma" of that injury or illness. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: EMPLOYEE
RIGHTS & EMPLOYER OBLIGATIONS § 3.03, at 3-81 to 3-82 (Jonathan R. Mook ed., 1997)
[hereinafter EMPLOYEE RIGHTS] (quoting Allen v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 64, 66 (D.C. Cir.
1985)).
The "regarded as" provision means that if the individual's employer or another entity
perceives or treats him as if he is disabled, then he can claim coverage under the Act, as
long as the perception substantially limits a major life activity. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1)
(1997). This provision is aimed, not at actual or recorded impairments, but at employers'
perceptions of disability that produce discrimination in the workplace. See EMPLOYEE
RIGHTS, supra, § 3.04[1], at 3-82.5 to 3-82.6; see also School Bd. of Nassau County v. Ar-
line, 480 U.S. 273, 282 n.9 (1987) (noting examples of cases where the "regarded as" provi-
sion was needed). In one case, a child with cerebral palsy was excluded from class because
he "'produced a nauseating effect on his classmates."' Id. In an employment-related case,
trustees denied an arthritic woman a position at a college because they did not want
"'normal students [to] see her."' Id.
6. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 50 (1990) (same), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332; id. pt. 3, at 27, (same), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.A.A.N. 445, 449; S.
REP. NO. 101-116, at 21 (stating that Congress intended the definition of "disability" was
to be comparable to that of "handicapped individuals" contained in the regulations im-
plementing the Rehabilitation Act). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 targeted "federal
contractors .... recipients of federal grants, and ... participants in federal programs." 1
HENRY H. PERRITI, JR., AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT HANDBOOK § 8.1, at 328
(3d ed. 1997). The Rehabilitation Act expanded previous legislative aid packages de-
signed to assist handicapped individuals, but it did not reach the private sector. See id.
§ 8.5, at 336-38. The ADA includes a provision requiring it to construe standards at least
as strictly as the Rehabilitation Act. See id. § 8.2, at 329. Indeed, the ADA also includes a
provision requiring coordination between enforcement agencies to ensure consistency in
applying the two laws. See id. at 329-30.
7. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and Activities Receiv-
ing or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance, 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676, 22,685-86 (1977)
[hereinafter Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap].
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Act be applied to the definition of disability in the ADA.8 Like the De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare, in considering the language
of the ADA, Congress stated its intention to limit coverage to exclude
trivial injuries or non-impairing characteristics.9 To prevent an overly
broad interpretation, the Act limits coverage to those injuries or illnesses
that substantially impair an individual in a major life activity. 0 Congress
intended the term "major life activity" to include such tasks as walking,
breathing, lifting, seeing, taking care of oneself, learning, and working."
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), in imple-
menting the ADA's provisions, adopted definitions for "physical im-
pairment" and "major life activities" virtually verbatim from the regula-
tions implementing the Rehabilitation Act." The term "substantially
limits," however, was not defined by the Rehabilitation Act regulations."
8. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 21; Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, 42
Fed. Reg. at 22,685-86 (analyzing the definition of handicapped persons). The Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare defined "handicapped individuals" covered by
the Rehabilitation Act to include those with physical or mental impairments that substan-
tially limited at least one major life activity. See id. at 22,685. It included having a "record
of" and being "regarded as having" a substantial impairment of a major life activity within
the covered conditions. Id. at 22,686.
The Agency refused to develop an exhaustive list of maladies that qualified as physical
or mental impairments because it believed a sufficiently comprehensive one was impossi-
ble. See id. at 22,685. The rule did eliminate as handicaps, standing alone, "environ-
mental, cultural, and economic disadvantage[s]," as well as "prison records, age, or homo-
sexuality." Id. at 22,686.
9. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (stating that physical characteristics such as eye or
hair color would not constitute a disability); id. at 23 (stating that injuries such as infected
fingers would not be considered disabilities).
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); see also EMPLOYEE RIGHTS, supra note 5, §§ 3.02-
.07 (discussing terms); 1 PERRITT, supra note 6, §§ 3.1-.3 (discussing statutory definitions).
11. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.A.A.N. 303, 334;
id. pt. 3, at 28 (same), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.A.A.N. 445, 450-51; S. REP. NO. 101-116, at
22 (defining the scope of major life activities). Congress did not intend this list to be ex-
clusive, and the EEOC regulations include other activities such as reaching, bending, and
sitting. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i) (1997).
12. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (defining physical impairments under the
ADA as "physiological disorder[s]," "cosmetic disfigurement[s]," or "anatomical
loss[es]"), and id. § 1630.2(i) (defining major life activities under the ADA to include
"caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breath-
ing, learning, and working), with 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1996) (defining physical im-
pairments under the Rehabilitation Act as "physiological disorder[s]," "cosmetic disfig-
urement[s]," or "anatomical loss[es]"), and id. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (defining major life activities
under the Rehabilitation Act to include "caring for one's self, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working").
13. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j); Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, 42 Fed.
Reg. at 22,685 (stating the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's position that
the definition for "substantially limits" was not achievable at that time).
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Therefore, the EEOC devised its own definition for purposes of the
ADA. The EEOC's definition of "substantially limits" uses a factor
analysis which takes into consideration the severity, duration, and long-
term impact of the injury or illness.14 In accordance with the statute,
courts apply these considerations to find a disability when the injury or
illness impairs activities such as walking, breathing, taking care of one-
self, or seeing. The activity of working is considered only when a com-
plainant cannot prove that he is substantially impaired in any other ma-
jor life activity." The EEOC, in delineating an additional step for
evaluating the major life activity of working, recognized a conceptual dif-
ference between limitations on one's ability to work and one's ability to
perform other major life activities; namely, that a "working" impairment
does not obtain coverage because of the medically diagnosed injury or
illness, but rather it is a product of societal barriers to the individual's
ability to obtain employment."
14. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii). The factors to be considered in determining
whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity are, "(i) The nature and
severity of the impairment; (ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
(iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact
of or resulting from the impairment." Id.
15. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i); see also Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d
723, 726 (5th Cir. 1995) (listing the factors recommended by the EEOC, then applying
them to Dutcher's claim of an impairment of "a major life activity other than working");
Nedder v. Rivier College, 908 F. Supp. 66, 75-77 (D.N.H. 1995) (citing EEOC factors to be
applied in determining a substantial limitation and applying them to Nedder's claim that
she was substantially limited in the major life activity of walking).
In a recent case, the court cited only to the basic definition of a substantial limitation of
a major life activity, but in fact considered the individual's condition in light of the sug-
gested factors. See Rogers v. International Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 758-59
(5th Cir. 1996) (analyzing the ability to perform major functions and the characterization
of Rogers's disability by his own occupational therapist as a mere 13% permanent, partial
disability, as factors in denying coverage).
16. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j). The court need not consider the impact of a dis-
ability on an individual's ability to work if the individual can show that he is substantially
impaired in any other major life activity because his ability to work would be affected, a
fortiori, by his inability to, for example, see or hear. See id. In Dutcher, the court ex-
pressed its willingness to consider the factors that the EEOC suggested courts apply to
claims of impairments of working, but refused to perform such an analysis because
Dutcher did not present any evidence. 53 F.3d at 727 n.13; see also Vaughan v. Harvard
Indus., Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1340, 1346-47 (W.D. Tenn. 1996) (reasoning that for a plaintiff to
establish a disability under the major life activity of working, he must present evidence of
his training, his geographic area of access, or a list of jobs requiring similar training);
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS, supra note 5, § 3.02(5), at 3-57, 3-63 to 3-65 (asserting that claimants
seeking to prove a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working must bring
forth evidence to establish the claim).
17. See tenBroek & Matson, supra note 4, at 814 (arguing that many handicaps are
not the result of the physical impairment, as much as they are the result of societal obsta-
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If an individual claims he is disabled in the major life activity of work-
ing, the EEOC suggests that, in addition to the analysis for other major
life activities, the courts employ three factors derived from case law un-
der the Rehabilitation Act: (1) how many jobs and of what type is the
person disqualified from because of his claimed disability; (2) to what
reasonable employment market does the person have access; and (3)
based on the person's education and training, what reasonable expecta-
tions of employment does the individual have. 8 These factors are used
because the individuals who claim to be disabled under the "working"
prong cannot show substantial impairment in regard to any other activ-
ity. 9 Although the EEOC attempts to define specifically the term "sub-
stantial impairment of a major life activity," courts have reached diver-
gent conclusions when applying the definition as it relates to working.0
cles toward integration); see also Williams v. Avnet, Inc., 910 F. Supp. 1124, 1131
(E.D.N.C. 1995) (explaining that impairments that do not limit most major life activities
must "generally foreclose" employment before they obtain coverage), affd, Williams v.
Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 1996); infra notes 139-40 (argu-
ing that the rationale for separating work from other major life activities for purposes of
evaluation under the ADA is that work is not a "major life-functioning task").
18. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3); E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1099-
1101 (D. Haw. 1980) (discussing the analysis of the three factors).
19. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (stating that there is no need to consider the major
life activity of working if the individual is substantially impaired in any other major life
activity such as seeing); infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text (discussing rationale for
separating "working" from other major life activities).
20. See Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 334 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that since
a hemophiliac firefighter was barred only from those jobs in which he was placed at a sig-
nificant risk of injury, he was not covered under the ADA because the class of jobs was
too narrow), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997). But see Frix v. Florida Tile Indus., Inc.,
970 F. Supp. 1027, 1034 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (holding that plaintiff's 25-pound lifting restric-
tion barred him from the class of jobs of "heavy labor" and, thus, constituted a substantial
impairment of his major life activity of working); Huber v. Howard County, 849 F. Supp.
407, 412 (D. Md. 1994) (holding that a firefighter's inability to advance in that profession,
based on a physical impairment, qualified him as disabled), affd, 56 F.3d 61 (4th Cir.
1995).
In an article analyzing E.E. Black, Professor Haines argued that a qualitative analysis of
the definition of disability, using individualized factors, would greatly complicate interpre-
tation of the Rehabilitation Act by allowing the definition of the term to be, at least poten-
tially, completely open-ended. See Andrew W. Haines, E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall: A
Penetrating Interpretation of "Handicapped Individual" for Sections 503 and 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973 and for Various State Equal Employment Opportunity Statutes, 16
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 527, 545 (1983). Professor Haines believed this complication was nec-
essary to honor the spirit of the Rehabilitation Act and that the alternative, a purely quan-
titative analysis, would allow first time discriminators to receive an "'anomalous gift."' Id.
at 546-47. A "gift" would result because a purely quantitative analysis would likely never
find a one-time case of discrimination to "substantially limit" employment. Id. at 547.
Alternatively, one author suggested that there would be little confusion in application of
the definitions under the ADA because of a substantial body of case law interpreting the
1998]
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At least one court has defined the term broadly,21 but, arguably, more
closely to the intent expressed by the EEOC in its regulations. 22 The
majority trend, however, is to define the term strictly, thus excluding
most claims.2 One commentator has called for radical changes to the
24regulations. Because the Supreme Court has yet to address affirma-
same definitions under the Rehabilitation Act. See Hart, supra note 4, at 945 (arguing that
the Rehabilitation Act cases had already clarified the "vague" terms in the definitions,
such as "disability").
21. See, e.g., Frix, 970 F. Supp. at 1034 (holding that, as suggested in the EEOC's In-
terpretive Guidance example of heavy labor jobs as a class of jobs from which disqualifica-
tion based on a statutory impairment should create coverage, exclusion from a class of
heavy labor jobs is a substantial limitation).
22. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1997) (providing an example of an individual with
a back problem that limits his ability to lift as being barred from a class of jobs and, subse-
quently, meeting the definition of substantial impairment). The EEOC evinces its intent
to provide broad coverage by its refusal to limit the list of major life activities, leaving
open the possibility that any daily functioning activity potentially could be deemed major.
See id. Also, by not allowing the consideration of mitigating measures, such as mainte-
nance medicine, the EEOC potentially broadened coverage. See id. The EEOC could
draw support from the statute's stated intent to provide broad coverage. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(b)(1) (1994) (stating that the purpose of the ADA is to "provide a clear and com-
prehensive national mandate [to] eliminat[e disabilities discrimination]"); cf Wendy Wil-
kinson, Judicially Crafted Barriers to Bringing Suit Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 907, 934 (1997) (arguing that many courts do not give adequate
deference to the EEOC regulations when interpreting the ADA and, consequently, reach
results in contradiction of the administrative intent). In support of Wilkinson's point, con-
sider that the EEOC Interpretive Guidance says that HIV is an inherently substantially
limiting physical impairment. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20). If the courts give the weight
to the interpretation Wilkinson suggests, HIV should be considered a per se disability. See
Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding HIV to be a per se disabil-
ity). But see Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Md., 95 F.3d 1285, 1289-90 (4th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting per se disability status for asymptomatic HIV, and instead holding that the de-
termination must be made on a case-by-case basis).
23. See Bridges, 92 F.3d at 334 (holding that firefighters and Emergency Medical
Technician backup firefighters only encompass a "narrow range of jobs," thus, being un-
able to work as a firefighter does not substantially limit a person's ability to work); Joyce
v. Suffolk County, 911 F. Supp. 92, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that an inability to per-
form police work is not a substantial limitation on the ability to work); Williams v. City of
Charlotte, 899 F. Supp. 1484, 1488 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (holding that an inability to work the
night shift is not a substantial limitation, even though it excluded the plaintiff from ap-
proximately one-half of the jobs in her field); Elstner v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 659 F.
Supp. 1328, 1343 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (holding that an inability to work as a telephone pole
climber is not a substantial limitation), aff'd, 863 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Wilkin-
son, supra note 22, at 908 (arguing that many cases are dismissed on motions for summary
judgment because of the judiciary's view that only traditional, severe disabilities should be
covered).
24. See generally R. Bales, Once Is Enough: Evaluating When a Person Is Substan-
tially Limited in Her Ability to Work, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 203 (1993). Bales argues that
the EEOC test for substantial impairment puts too great an onus on workers to prove dis-
crimination and does not give equal treatment to unskilled workers or those in densely
populated areas. See id. at 234-41. Bales suggests that the test should be similar to the one
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tively the issue of which interpretation is correct, the definition remains
unclear.25
This Comment explores the definitions of a disability under the ADA,
examines court construction of those definitions, and offers a solution for
reaching more principled decisions. In particular, this Comment focuses
on the definition of a substantial limitation on the major life activity of
working. Part I of this Comment reviews the statutory definitions of a
disability and discusses the seminal case and its progeny under the Reha-
bilitation Act. Part I then discusses how the EEOC has defined the term
"disability" under the ADA. Next, it provides some examples of the
ways differing courts have construed those definitions. In Part II, this
Comment analyzes the courts' majority approach in light of congres-
sional intent. It criticizes the majority for failing to provide principled
decisions upon which meaningful precedent can be built. It also criticizes
the minority for applying the EEOC guidance mechanically and for fail-
ing to read that guidance in context. Finally, this Comment offers a
modest proposal to reach more principled solutions, while maintaining
fidelity to congressional intent, by suggesting that the courts engage in a
thorough factual analysis using the factors the EEOC has provided in its
regulations for determining when an impairment substantially limits the
major life activity of working.
I. DEFINING THE DEFINITIONS
A. The First Attempts at Defining Substantially Limits as It Relates to
Working
It is evident when reading the legislative history of the ADA, together
with the implementing regulations of the Rehabilitation Act, that Con-
gress intended the Rehabilitation Act case law to serve as interpretive
material for the EEOC in promulgating regulations under the ADA,
26
used for Title VII claims, that is the burden shifts to the employer to prove it had legiti-
mate reasons for the rejection or dismissal once the protected characteristic is shown to
have been a consideration for adverse action. See id. at 245-46.
25. The Supreme Court may provide some guidance when it decides Abbott v. Brag-
don, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. granted in part by 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997), concerning
whether asymptomatic HIV is a covered disability and whether reproduction is a major
life activity.
26. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 50 (1990) (stating that "[t]he definition of the
term 'disability' . . . is comparable to [that] in ... the Rehabilitation Act."), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.A.A.N. 303, 332; id. pt. 3, at 27 (same), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.A.A.N. 445,
449; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 21 (1989) (same); see also Nondiscrimination on the Basis of
Handicap, 42 Fed. Reg. at 22,685 (declining to define "substantially limits"); 29 C.F.R.
app. § 1630.2(g) (1997) (stating that "Congress intended that the relevant caselaw [sic] de-
19981 1063
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and for courts interpreting those regulations." In developing its regula-
tions to define disability under the ADA, the EEOC stated its reliance
on case law under the Rehabilitation Act as a source of interpretation for
the ADA." The EEOC's decision to rely on Rehabilitation Act cases for
interpretive guidance can be explained partially by reference to Con-
gress's apparent intent to rely on those cases. Even if the EEOC had
wanted to rely on the Rehabilitation Act's language for interpretive
guidance, it would have been unable to do so for terms such as "substan-
tially limits" because such terms were not defined by either the Rehabili-
tation Act or its implementing regulations. 29 The Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare's decision not to define the term "substantially
limits," when it developed regulations for the Rehabilitation Act, exem-
plifies the challenge in developing meaningful definitions.30 By its failure,
however, the agency left the task to the courts. Although the EEOC,
when it implemented the ADA regulations, developed definitions
through an extended rulemaking,31 it admitted that many terms would
continue to be defined necessarily on a case-by-case basis.32
veloped under the Rehabilitation Act be generally applicable to the term 'disability' as
used in the ADA"); 1 PERRITr, supra note 6, § 8.2, at 329-30 (concluding that Congress
intended the law under the ADA to complement, but not duplicate or conflict with, the
law under the Rehabilitation Act); Bales, supra note 24, at 217-18 (stating that Congress
retained the definitions set forth in the Rehabilitation Act regulations for interpretation of
the ADA); Hart, Legislative Note, supra note 4, at 945 (stating that the Rehabilitation Act
interpretations will be persuasive authority for ADA cases); Kathleen D. Henry, Legal
Development, Civil Rights and the Disabled: A Comparison of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 in the Employment Setting, 54 ALB. L.
REV. 123, 124-25 (1989) (arguing that the ADA is an extension to the private sector of the
Rehabilitation Act).
27. See Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 725 n.4, 726 (5th Cir. 1995)
(noting that the definitions of "disability" and "major life activities" in EEOC regulations
are significantly similar to those in the Rehabilitation Act); EEOC v. Exxon Corp., 967 F.
Supp. 208, 212 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (stating that Congress intended "the two acts' judicial and
agency standards [to] be harmonized"); Jackson v. Boise Cascade Corp., 941 F. Supp.
1122, 1126 n.2 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (noting that Rehabilitation Act cases are "authoritative"
precedent for ADA cases); Rakestraw v. Carpenter Co., 898 F. Supp. 386, 389 n.1 (N.D.
Miss. 1995) (noting that Congress intended Rehabilitation Act case law to provide guid-
ance for courts in resolving ADA cases).
28. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(g) (stating that Congress intended that Rehabilitation
Act case law be applied to ADA definitions).
29. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793, 794; Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, 42
Fed. Reg. at 22,685.
30. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, 42 Fed. Reg. at 22,685 (declin-
ing to define the term "substantial limit").
31. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,726 (1991). The Agency received 697 comments dur-
ing the two month public comment period. See id.
32. See id.
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1. E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall
Because the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare refused to
define the term "substantially limits," courts were faced with trying to
develop a standard that allowed for broad coverage under the Rehabili-
tation Act without lowering the threshold to a point at which eligibility
would be automatic.33 In the seminal Rehabilitation Act case, E.E.
Black, Ltd. v. Marshall,4 the United States District Court for Hawaii
recognized this difficulty, especially the inherent danger of creating a
rigid definition which was either too broad or narrow, and subsequently
responded by developing a factorial analysis that would allow for signifi-
cant flexibility in each case.35 In E.E. Black, George Crosby, an appren-
tice carpenter, had worked for several years accumulating approximately
3600 hours of the 8000-hour requirement for becoming a journeyman
carpenter; however, he had injured his back twice during that time.36
When the local union sent Crosby to work for E.E. Black, Ltd., he was
denied work because the company doctor identified him as a high-risk
candidate for injury. Although a second doctor cleared him for work on
the condition that Crosby maintain good muscle tone of his back and ab-
domen, Crosby had significant difficulty obtaining employment because
38of the original report.
Crosby filed a complaint with the Hawaii Department of Labor,
claiming that he had been rejected from employment on the basis of his
33. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, 42 Fed. Reg. at 22,685.
34. 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).
35. See id. at 1100-02; see also Bales, supra note 24, at 225-31 (analyzing how E.E.
Black and its progeny defined substantial limitations on the major life activity of working);
Haines, supra note 20, at 531 (lauding the analysis in E.E. Black as "a significant effort to
advance our thinking" on the concept of a "handicapped individual").
36. E.E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1091. On the first occasion, Crosby injured his back
carrying a load of lumber. See id. In the second instance, he "'felt a little discomfort'
when moving a concrete form, and was subsequently X-rayed, revealing a congenital back
anomaly. Id.
37. See id. The company required pre-employment physicals and the doctor exam-
ining Crosby determined that he was a "poor risk for heavy labor." Id. Another doctor,
however, disagreed that Crosby's back condition would prevent him from performing the
tasks required of a carpenter's apprentice. See id. at 1091-92.
38. See id. Crosby's claim would come under the "regarded as" prong of the defini-
tion for disability under either the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA because the adverse
treatment by the potential employers resulted from the perception of his injury as substan-
tially limiting (i.e., that his back was prone to reinjury on the job), rather than its actual
limitation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994); supra note 5 (discussing the Act's coverage
of individuals who are "regarded as" disabled); see also 1 PERRITr, supra note 6, § 3.5, at
48-53 (discussing case law interpreting the "regarded as" prong); Bales, supra note 24, at
221-25 (discussing the definition of "regarded as" and its application by the courts).
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congenital back abnormality.39 The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
rejected Crosby's claim, reasoning that the perceived impairment did not
create a substantial limitation on his major life activity of working.40 The
ALJ argued that Congress had not intended to reach persons with less
than "'the most disabling"' impairments, and that the requirement for
coverage should be a bar to general employment. 4' The Assistant Secre-
tary of Labor overruled the ALJ's interpretation as too limiting and in-
stead adopted the view that the coverage extended to anyone having an
impairment that created a bar to the "'employment of one's choice...
[that one] is currently capable of performing.' 42 Neither the AL's nor
the Assistant Secretary's view prevailed in the district court.43
The district court rejected the AL's reasoning as contravening the
purposes of the Rehabilitation Act by restricting access to protection
more stringently than Congress had intended. ' The court also reasoned
that the Assistant Secretary's reading was too broad and undermined
congressional intent by making the term "substantially limits" mere sur-
plusage."
39. See E.E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1092.
40. See id. at 1093. The AU agreed that Crosby had an impairment, but did not con-
sider it one that substantially limited his ability to work. See id.
41. Id. at 1093-94. The ALT found that a bar to heavy labor jobs only disqualified
Crosby from a very few jobs when that category was viewed as part of the entire labor
force. See id. at 1094. The AU further determined that only those disabilities that pre-
vented individuals from engaging in the full spectrum of available employment could be
considered substantially limiting. See id.
42. Id. The ALT and Assistant Secretary agreed on a definition of "impairment,"
which was not defined in the statute or regulations. See id. They defined impairment as
"'any condition which weakens, diminishes, restricts, or otherwise damages an individual's
health or physical.., activity."' Id. Nonetheless, the Assistant Secretary rejected the con-
tention that coverage could be obtained only upon a showing of disqualification from
many or most jobs. See id. Instead, he adopted a much more expansive view of the defini-
tion of a substantial limitation on the ability to work, that is, disqualification from the cur-
rent job in which one chooses, and is currently able, to work. See id.
43. See id. at 1099 (holding that the Assistant Secretary's view was overbroad, but the
ALT's view "undercut[] the purpose[]" of the Act). The district court did say that the As-
sistant Secretary's reasoning comported more closely with the Rehabilitation Act's pur-
poses than the ALT's reasoning. See id. at 1101. The court observed that the ALJ's inter-
pretation of "substantially limits," that results in a bar from almost all employment
available regardless of type, was too narrow in light of the congressional intent that the
Act have a broad scope and that coverage be determined case-by-case. See id. at 1102.
44. See id. at 1099.
45. See id. The court reasoned that the Assistant Secretary's interpretation of "sub-
stantially limits"-that an individual disqualified from the job of his choice would be eligi-
ble for coverage-would allow an individual to claim protection based on rejection from
one particular job, even though that individual had been offered identical jobs in locations,
or under conditions, that did not pose any difficulty based on the impairment. See id. For
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The district court determined that disability claims must be decided on
a case-by-case basis, using several objective factors to determine whether
an individual is substantially impaired in a major life activity.46 The first
factor is the number of positions and types of employment unavailable to
the individual due to the alleged condition.47 To make an effective com-
parison, it is necessary to assume all employers would utilize the same or
similar hiring criteria.4 ' The second factor is the number of employers
with similar requirements that exist in the geographical area.4 9 This crite-
rion prevents coverage for applicants who are turned away from a job
because that particular plant or office has a characteristic that aggravates
the impairment, but is not shared by similar employers, thus still allowing
the applicant to work at a different, but similar, location." It also pre-
vents the rejecting employer, who is the only one of its type in a reasona-
bly accessible geographic area, from claiming that other jobs exist when
in fact access to them is prohibitive due to distance. 1 Third, the district
court considered the geographical area to which the applicant has rea-
sonable access to avoid a comparison of employers in a city to which the
individual could not reasonably travel." Finally, the court considered the
individual's own "expectations and training." 3
example, someone who could not work in a location because of a loud noise, but was of-
fered comparable employment without that noise problem, could claim coverage under
the Assistant Secretary's interpretation of the Act. See id. The court noted that if Con-
gress had intended such broad coverage, it would not have required a "substantial limit,"
but only a "limit," on a major life activity to obtain coverage. See id. This reading was
unsupportable because it would have made the term mere surplusage and ignored con-
gressional intent. See id.
46. See E.E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1100.
47. See id.
48. See id. This exercise prevents an employer with some peculiar or aberrational
criterion from claiming that the adversely affected individual can find employment else-
where, since the qualifications required here are so specialized. See id
49. See id. at 1101. It is important to note that "similar" applies not only to the
working conditions, but also may include salary and benefits considerations. See id. at
1101 n.13.
50. See id. at 1101. The court noted that an inability to work at one plant containing
a substance to which the applicant is allergic would not be a substantial impairment to
work where the employer had offered the applicant a job at other plants that did not con-
tain the offending substance. See id. at 1099. This argument is similar to the one in Forrisi
v. Bowen, where the court held that the employee's inability to work at one particular
plant, when positions were available at other plants that did not aggravate his condition,
did not satisfy the definition of substantial impairment. See 794 F.2d 931, 935 (4th Cir.
1986).
51. See E.E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1101.
52. See id.
53. Id. The court argued that this point is especially important if the claims are to be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and also to honor Congress's intent that the Act have
1998] 1067
Catholic University Law Review
These objective factors became the test for evaluating the term "sub-
stantially limits" in the context of working. 4 The court's definition was
significant because it created a framework for future analysis by other
courts considering the issue, which the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare had declined to provide in its original rules imple-
menting the Rehabilitation Act.5 Other courts, at least purportedly,
followed the analysis in E.E. Black in considering Rehabilitation Act
claims. 6 Although the EEOC did not formally adopt the test from E.E.
Black, it developed a similar factor analysis for evaluating claims of sub-
stantial impairment of working under the ADA.57
broad coverage. See id. at 1101-02. If the claims are not evaluated on a case-by-case basis,
very narrow readings, like that provided by the ALJ, would be easily defensible. Cf id. at
1100 (holding that claimants should qualify for coverage only if they were limited from
"employability generally"). If one does not consider the expectations and training of the
individual, then, presumably, that individual would have to take any job available, re-
gardless of remuneration, as long as the job could be performed notwithstanding the indi-
vidual's impairment. See id. at 1099. The court used an example of a chemist who, after
being rejected from a chemistry job because of his impairment, would not be "heartened"
if he could still obtain employment as a streetcar conductor. See id.
54. See Haines, supra note 20, at 562. Haines argues that the court's formula does a
good job in protecting individuals against "single-instance" or "first-time" discrimination
because it focuses on the qualitative factors affecting the employee and does not use a
strict quantitative analysis to determine the threshold of coverage. See id. He argues,
however, that the court did not adequately quell the fear of a "totally open-ended defini-
tion," that is, one that seemingly has no boundaries. See id. Indeed, Professor Haines
pointed out that the court recognized the deficiency by emphasizing the case-by-case ap-
proach required by Congress, thus allowing the court to use a potentially over-broad in-
terpretation because its determination only applied to the particular case at hand. See id.
But see Bales, supra note 24, at 235-36 (criticizing the EEOC for not adopting, as a sepa-
rate factor for consideration, the individual's "'training, knowledge, skills, and abilities"'
which was critical to the outcome of E.E. Black).
55. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, 42 Fed. Reg. at 22,685 (stating
HEW's belief that a definition of "substantially limits" was impossible at that time).
56. See Byrne v. Board of Educ., 979 F.2d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 1992) (relying on the
"Black decision"); Taylor v. United States Postal Serv., 946 F.2d 1214, 1217 (6th Cir. 1991)
(citing the analysis from E.E. Black); Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir. 1986)
(quoting the E.E. Black court's factors); Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d
1244, 1249 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing factors from the E.E. Black court as relevant for deter-
mination of a disability claim); Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 745 (C.D.
Cal. 1984) (citing with approval the E.E. Black court's factor analysis).
57. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii) reads in relevant part
(A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access;
(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an im-
pairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge,
skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also
disqualified because of the impairment (class of jobs); and/or
(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an im-
pairment, and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training,
knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the indi-
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The court in E.E. Black interpreted the Rehabilitation Act's definition
broadly, potentially bringing a much larger class of individuals under the
Act's protection than the ALJ believed that Congress intended 8 On the
other hand, the court recognized the inherent risk in such a broad read-
ing, namely that undeserving individuals might qualify for coverage." It
warned of the danger of an individual who claimed discrimination after
being rejected from one job receiving protection under the Rehabilita-
tion Act.6
2. Jasany v. United States Postal Service
Federal courts heeded E.E. Black's warning against finding undeserv-
ing individuals qualified for coverage under the Rehabilitation Act, par-
ticularly focusing on the number of jobs from which an individual was
disqualified, and dismissing claims where they did not see a substantial
61
barrier to the individual's employment. In Jasany v. United States
Postal Service,62 the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff's inability to carry
out the duties of only one job within the workplace was not a substantial
limitation on his ability to work.6' Thomas Jasany was hired by the Post
Office to work as an operator of a mail-sorting machine. 64 He suffered
from strabismus (crossed eyes) and experienced difficulty operating the
machine, but had no other complications when performing other duties.
The Post Office terminated him after he repeatedly refused to operate
the mail-sorting machine because the union contract did not entitle him
to transfer to another position based on his condition.66 The Sixth Circuit
vidual is also disqualified because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in vari-
ous classes).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii) (1997).
58. See E.E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1099; supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text
(discussing the rejection of the ALJ's and Assistant Secretary's reasoning).
59. See E.E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1099. The court believed that the Assistant Secre-
tary's interpretation was overbroad and, if adopted, would contravene congressional intent
by making the term "substantial" unnecessary. See id.
60. See id. The court used the example of an acrophobiac who was offered ten posi-
tions with one company and received protection under the Act based on his impairment
from working after he was disqualified from one position due to its location on the 37th
floor. See id.
61. See generally Forrisi, 794 F.2d at 931; Jasany, 755 F.2d at 1244.
62. 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985).
63. See id. at 1250.
64. See id. at 1247.
65. See id. Jasany was able to perform such tasks as manual distribution of mail. See
id.
66. See id. The American Postal Worker's Union filed a grievance against the Postal
Service, claiming that the union contract provisions entitled Jasany to reassignment within
the Postal Service. See id. The arbitrator found no right to reassignment existed. See id.
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reversed the district court's finding that Jasany was handicapped under
the Rehabilitation Act.67
Indeed, the Jasany court suggested that, when read with the require-
68ment that an individual otherwise be qualified, the definition of "sub-
stantially limits" as it relates to working also would exclude from the
Act's coverage those individuals who were barred from only a "narrow
range of jobs."69 In Jasany, the court noted that the legislative history of
the Rehabilitation Act did not explain the point at which an individual
The fact that Jasany lost the arbitration of his grievance did not preclude his Rehabilita-
tion Act claim. See id. at 1247-48. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., the Supreme
Court held that arbitration of a contractual right arising out of a collective bargaining
agreement does not preclude the complaining individual from bringing a separate action in
court based on an "independent statutory right." 415 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1974). In Gardner-
Denver, the employee was allowed to pursue a Title VII racial discrimination claim after
losing a grievance arbitration. See id. The Court reasoned that the employee, by bringing
the Title VII action, was not seeking judicial review of his arbitration proceeding, but
rather asserting a "statutory right independent of the arbitration process." Id. at 54.
If, however, the Jasany plaintiff's collective bargaining agreement had stated that the
arbitrator could resolve not only contract but statutory complaints as well, the claim may
have been precluded on that ground. See generally Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (holding that a securities analyst's claim of wrongful dis-
charge was precluded by a New York Stock Exchange requirement that all applicants
wishing to be registered agree to arbitrate all employment disputes). For further discus-
sion of how Gilmer may be a precursor for a major shift of employment disputes out of the
hands of the judiciary and into private arbitration, see generally Robert A. Gorman, The
Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public-Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV.
635.
67. See Jasany, 755 F.2d at 1250. The district court regarded the plaintiffs inability to
work on the specified machine, caused by his physical impairment of strabismus (crossed-
eyes), as a substantial limit on his major life activity of working. See id. at 1248. The court
of appeals agreed that Jasany suffered from a physical impairment as defined in the stat-
ute. See id. The court found, however, that his impairment only limited his ability to op-
erate one machine; he was only unable to do one particular job. See id. at 1250. The court
reasoned that this single limitation, along with Jasany's ability to perform other functions
within the Post Office, disqualified him from coverage. See id.
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994) (defining the term qualified individual with a dis-
ability"). This Comment does not address the "otherwise qualified" definition. Briefly, an
individual is otherwise qualified if he is able to satisfy the employer's program require-
ments, despite his handicap. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,
406 (1979). In Davis, the Court held that a hearing-impaired nursing student was not
"otherwise qualified" because her inability to hear prevented her from safely interacting
with patients without close and constant supervision. See id. at 409-10. The Court further
reasoned that it doubted any level of accommodation would suffice to allow Davis to
complete all of the nursing-program requirements. See id. at 409.
69. Jasany, 755 F.2d at 1249 n.3. The court concluded that a narrow range of jobs
does not equate to the major life activity of working or, if it does, the inability to perform
this narrow range of jobs is not a substantial limitation. See id.; see also Amalia Magda-
lena Villalba, Comment, Defining "Disability" Under the Americans With Disabilities Act,
22 U. BALT. L. REV. 357, 363-64 (1993) (citing Jasany v. United States Postal Service as
one of the leading cases interpreting the definition of "substantially limits").
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could claim a "substantial limitation" on his major life activity of working
caused by lost job opportunities.70 Further, the regulations implementing
the Rehabilitation Act did not define the term "substantially limits,"
claiming it was impossible, and leaving that challenge to the courts.7'
Considering the facts surrounding Thomas Jasany's situation, the Sixth
Circuit reasoned that the plaintiff was limited from only one job and,
hence, could not be substantially limited in working.72
3. Forrisi v. Bowen
Trying to define the boundaries of coverage, the Fourth Circuit placed
significant weight on the term "substantial" by concluding that although
Congress may have intended broad coverage, it did not intend coverage
to extend beyond the boundaries of the class of individuals who, as a re-
sult of their impairment, faced significant challenges to securing and
maintaining employment. In Forrisi v. Bowen,74 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals reemphasized the significance of the term "substan-
tially limits," making a statement similar to the E.E. Black court's argu-
ment against surplusage. 7' The Fourth Circuit said that the inclusion of
the "substantially limits" language indicated Congress's intent that only
"significant" impairments receive protection under the Rehabilitation
Act.76 Like the court in Jasany, the court in Forrisi observed that Con-
gress intended the statute to protect a relatively narrow class of individu-
als who were "truly handicapped" and whose characteristics were not
"widely shared., 77
70. Jasany, 755 F.2d at 1248 & n.2. The court referred instead to the E.E. Black
court's analysis, which reasoned that a court should consider only situations where the in-
dividual was barred from "obtain[ing] satisfactory employment." Id. at 1248 (citing E.E.
Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1099-1100 (D. Haw. 1980)). The E.E. Black
court refused to consider situations where the individual could not perform a particular
job. See E.E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1099-1100.
71. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, 42 Fed. Reg. at 22,685.
72. See Jasany, 755 F.2d at 1250.
73. See Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933-34 (4th Cir. 1986).
74. 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986).
75. See id. at 933-34.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 934 (citing Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1249 (6th
Cir. 1985)). This interpretation finds support in the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare's final rule defining "handicapped individuals." See Nondiscrimination on
the Basis of Handicap, 42 Fed. Reg. at 22,686 (declining to limit the definition to those
persons with "traditional" handicaps but stating HEW's intention to commit its resources
to combating discrimination "against persons with the severe handicaps that were the fo-
cus of concern in the Rehabilitation Act").
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B. Defining Impairment
In defining the term disability, the ADA uses the term "impairment"
of a physical or mental function." According to the EEOC, an impair-
ment may exist notwithstanding the fact that the individual functions
normally with the help of medicine or prosthetic devices.79 The term
does not include conditions that, although potentially impairing in some
way, are characteristics of environment, physiology, culture, or economic
background, because these are not considered per se physical or mental
impairments. 80 Examples given by the EEOC in its Interpretive Guid-
ance following the regulations include such characteristics as hair color,
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). This Comment focuses on physical, not mental,
impairment cases. The impairment concept under the ADA is the same as under the Re-
habilitation Act. See Bales, supra note 24, at 217-21 (discussing the concept of impair-
ment).
79. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1997) (giving the example that an epileptic is still
considered disabled, even though his condition is controlled by medication); see also
Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 765 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that the EEOC's de-
termination, that mitigating factors should not be taken into account when determining
the existence of a disability, is consistent with both the text and legislative history of the
ADA); Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting with approval,
EEOC guidelines that prohibit consideration of mitigating measures in the determination
of whether an individual is disabled), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 693 (1998); Harris v. H & W
Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 520-21 (11th Cir. 1996) (same); Canon v. Clark, 883 F.
Supp. 718, 721 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (holding that an insulin-dependent diabetic alleged a col-
orable ADA claim by stating that she would lapse into a coma without her medication).
But see Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 169 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding
asymptomatic HIV not to be a per se impairment, and, a fortiori, not a per se disability
because it did not physically prevent the individual from performing any major life func-
tion); Deckert v. City of Ulysses, No. 93-1295-PFK, 1995 WL 580074, at *6 (D. Kan. Sept.
6, 1995) (holding insulin-dependent diabetic not to be disabled because no major life ac-
tivity was substantially impaired), affd, 105 F.3d 669 (10th Cir. 1996); Coghlan v. H.J.
Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 813 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (questioning the EEOC requirement
that courts not consider mitigating factors in determining disability). The Coghlan court
reasoned that someone with controlled diabetes is not limited in performing major life ac-
tivities and is, therefore, not within the statutory definition of "disability." See id. The
general thrust of cases like Coghlan seems to be that if someone has an impairment that is
controlled with only a maintenance dosage drug or something as common as eyeglasses,
then that individual is not substantially limited in the activity which the disease or condi-
tion otherwise inhibits. See Schluter v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1445
(W.D. Wis. 1996) (reasoning that if an individual can control his diabetes with insulin or
his near-sightedness with glasses, he cannot be substantially limited in a major life activ-
ity); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 881 (D. Kan. 1996) (same)
(quoting Schluter, 928 F. Supp at 1445).
80. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h). The definition prevents normal differences in
character, including social, cultural, physical, and mental, from being construed as "dis-
abilities." See Bales, supra note 24, at 206; Anna Phipps Engh, Note, The Rehabilitation
Act of 1973: Focusing the Definition of a Handicapped Individual, 30 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 149, 175 (1988) (arguing that "normal" differences encompass a "wide range" of
abilities).
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height or weight, pregnancy, poor judgment, poverty, lack of education,
or even advanced age." Coverage, however, will not be restricted if the
party with one of these characteristics also has an actual physical or men-
tal impairment."
Not all courts have adhered strictly to these limitations when faced
with the many challenges to the Act's boundaries." In one case, a
woman claimed she was disabled due to her morbid obesity.84 The dis-
81. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h). The EEOC does make the distinction that charac-
teristics such as advanced age, although not impairments on their own, may bring with
them conditions such as osteoporosis or arthritis that would be considered impairments.
See id.
82. See id. Further, impairments that are the result of conditions, such as osteoporo-
sis caused by aging, or even certain pregnancy-related illnesses, may be covered. See id.;
see also Pritchard v. MacNeal Hosp., 960 F. Supp. 1321, 1328 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that
osteoporosis, or osteoarthritis, is a permanent physical impairment); Erickson v. Board of
Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316, 323 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding infertility to be an impairment
because it impaired the major life activity of reproduction); Zatarain v. WDSU-Television,
Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 242 n.1 (E.D. La. 1995) (citing EEOC Interpretive Guidance that
osteoporosis may be covered), affd, 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996); Pacourek v. Inland Steel
Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1404-05 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding esphofical reflux, which pre-
vented plaintiff from becoming pregnant naturally, to be a statutory impairment). For dis-
cussion of the infertility issue, see Sandra M. Tomkowicz, The Disabling Effects of Infertil-
ity: Fertile Grounds for Accommodating Infertile Couples Under the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1051, 1091-92 (1996) (concluding that both part-
ners of an infertile couple should be considered disabled because they are both substan-
tially limited in their ability to bear children); Kristina M. Hall, Note, Pacourek v. Inland
Steel Company: Enforcing Equal Protection Rights by Designating Infertility as a Disability
Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 11 BYU J. PUB. L. 287, 300 (1997) (concluding
that infertility is a "reproductive impairment" and should be treated similarly to other im-
pairments).
83. See Christian v. St. Anthony Med. Ctr., Inc., 117 F.3d 1051, 1051-52 (7th Cir.
1997) (stating, in dicta, that hypercholesterolemia-high cholesterol- may be covered by
the Act because treatment of the condition is disabling); Cerrato v. Durham, 941 F. Supp.
388, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that pregnancy-related conditions, such as dizziness,
cramping, spotting, leaking, and nausea, if sufficiently severe, may qualify as disabilities
under the Act).
At least one commentator believes genetic impairments, including those which have yet
to manifest any symptoms, should be covered. See Jon D. Bible, When Employers Look
for Things Other than Drugs: The Legality of AIDS, Genetic, Intelligence, and Honesty
Testing in the Workplace, 41 LAB. L.J. 195, 206 (1990) (arguing that a genetic test showing
an impairment, e.g., the sickle cell anemia trait, would qualify that individual as disabled).
See generally Brian R. Gin, Genetic Discrimination: Huntington's Disease and the Ameri-
cans With Disabilities Act, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1406 (1997) (arguing that latent
Huntington's disease should be covered under the ADA). For a practical discussion on
avoiding "pitfalls" in testing employees, see Jonathan R. Mook, Personality Testing in To-
day's Workplace: Avoiding the Legal Pitfalls, 22 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 65, 75-80 (1996)
(discussing prohibitions and allowances for employee medical exams under the ADA).
84. See Nedder v. Rivier College, 908 F. Supp. 66, 73 (D.N.H. 1995) (claiming morbid
obesity substantially limited her ability to ambulate). See generally William C. Taussig,
Note, Weighing in Against Obesity Discrimination: Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of
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trict court denied her claim, not on the grounds that she had no impair-
ment, but because her impairment did not substantially limit a major life
activity.5 The court acknowledged some apparent flexibility in the
regulation's definition of impairment if the condition was sufficiently se-
vere, but nonetheless, it held that an impairment must exist. For exam-
ple, in another case where the court denied a claim, the individual ex-
ceeded weight restrictions for a flight attendant position because he was
an avid body builder."7 The district court held that he did not have an
impairment at all, because his condition was not the result of some physi-
cal deficiency, but rather the result of extensive physical training."'
In another case, the plaintiff was denied protection under the ADA for
an alleged disability based on pregnancy and related medical conditions,
such as ovarian cysts, because the court concluded that the conditions
were not impairments under the ADA.89 The court found that pregnancy
Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals and the Recognition of Obesity as a Disability
Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 35 B.C. L. REV. 927
(1994) (arguing that the Cook holding should be extended beyond morbid obesity to in-
clude general obesity as an impairment); Steven M. Ziolkowski, Case Comment, The
Status of Weight-Based Employment Discrimination Under the Americans With Disabilities
Act After Cook v. Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospi-
tals, 74 B.U. L. REV. 667 (1994) (arguing for inclusion of obesity in the list of ADA and
Rehabilitation Act impairments).
85. See Nedder, 908 F. Supp. at 74-77. The court "assume[d] arguendo" that Nedder
had a statutory "impairment." Id. at 74. It analyzed testimony relating to her condition,
considered the EEOC regulations and relevant case law, but concluded that Nedder's im-
pairment did not rise to the level of a substantial limitation. See id. at 77. The court rea-
soned that neither the inability to walk briskly, nor obesity, standing alone, constituted a
disability. See id. at 75-76. The court relied in particular on a case involving an individual
suffering from post-polio-related impairments affecting his ability to walk. See id. at 76. In
that case, the court found that the plaintiff had difficulty climbing stairs and experienced
limited body motion, yet the court held that he was not substantially limited in a major life
activity. See id. (quoting Stone v. Entergy Servs., Inc., Civ. A. No. 94-2669, 1995 WL
368473, at *3-4 (E.D. La. June 20, 1995); see also Smaw v. Virginia Dep't of State Police,
862 F. Supp. 1469, 1475 (E.D. Va. 1994) (holding that a state trooper, who claimed that
she was terminated because of her obesity, did not have a physical impairment because
she presented no evidence that the condition impaired any major life activity); infra notes
102-10 and accompanying text (defining major life activity).
86. See Nedder, 908 F. Supp. at 74-75.
87. See Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 746 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (holding
that disqualification from a flight attendant's job due to the candidate's overweight condi-
tion, resulting from his body-building activities, did not constitute a limit on a major life
activity because it only barred him from one job). The court also reasoned that the claim-
ant's condition was not the result of a physiological disorder, and, therefore, could not
qualify as a statutory impairment. See id.
88. See id.
89. See Tsetseranos v. Tech Prototype, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 109, 119 (D.N.H. 1995)
(concluding that barring unusual circumstances, pregnancy and related conditions are not
disabilities under the ADA). The court justified its conclusion, in part, by arguing that
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was not, standing alone, a statutory impairment because, as suggested by
the EEOC regulations, it was not a physiological disorder.90 The court
then quoted the regulation excluding temporary conditions, and con-
cluded, although not elaborating on its reasoning, that ovarian cysts and,
more broadly, all pregnancy-related conditions, were of insufficient dura-
tion to qualify as impairments under the ADA.91 The court explained
that these complications were related to the temporary, non-statutorily
impairing condition of pregnancy.92
The EEOC, perhaps anticipating difficult and unique cases, developed
broad categories into which impairments may fall: "physiological disor-
der[s], or condition[s], cosmetic disfigurement[s], or anatomical loss[es]
affecting [a] body system[]." 93 The EEOC adopted the position of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare under the Rehabilitation
Act, refusing to make an exhaustive list of specific diseases and disorders
because of the impossibility of compiling a comprehensive list.9 In the
legislative history of the ADA, however, Congress focused its attention
on individuals who suffered from severe physical limitations caused by
the loss of a major body function or limb, or even as a result of a serious
illness such as cancer or AIDS.95 Thus, although the EEOC created
pregnancy discrimination is already covered by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and Ti-
tle VII. See id. But see Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.10(b) (1997) (stating that, under the ADA, disabilities caused by pregnancy or
other related medical conditions would be treated the same as those caused by other
medical conditions); Kindlesparker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 9 A.D.D. 881, 882 (N.D.
Ill. 1995) (holding that the ADA does not "countenance[] discharge because a woman
must seek medical attention related to pregnancy"). The Kindlesparker court's statement
implies that it believed that termination of a woman for being pregnant invoked the same
concerns that the ADA was intended to combat. See id.
90. See Tsetseranos, 893 F. Supp. at 119 (quoting the non-impairment exclusion of the
EEOC regulations).
91. See id.
92. See id. (quoting the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)).
93. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (1997).
94. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, 42 Fed. Reg. at 22,685.
95. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 4 (1989). Witnesses testifying before the committee
were a cancer survivor, a blind attorney, a quadriplegic, the Vice President of the National
Coalition for Cancer Survivorship, and a representative of the National Organizations Re-
sponding to AIDS. See id. The representation at the hearings, as well as legislative his-
tory from the Rehabilitation Act, buttresses the argument that the severely handicapped
were the focus of the ADA. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, 42 Fed.
Reg. at 22,686 (stating that persons with severe handicaps were the focus of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973).
The goal was not to lower the threshold for coverage to include a broader base of peo-
ple, but rather to extend the protections afforded under the Rehabilitation Act to disabled
persons in the private sector. See Bales, supra note 24, at 210 (arguing that a "major
shortcoming" of the Rehabilitation Act was its "limited scope" that did not include private
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broad categories into which physical infirmities might properly be classi-
fied as impairments, it seems evident from Congress's focus that the in-
tention was to limit what would qualify. Underlying Congress's intent
was the unstated purpose of preventing individuals who were disqualified
from a job because of a physical deficiency, such as an overweight condi-
tion, from claiming that they were impaired within the meaning of the
ADA.96
Indeed, in Jasany, the Fourth Circuit criticized the E.E. Black court for
not making the critical distinction between an actual impairment and
merely a limiting physical trait.97 The Jasany court said that if a court did
not focus on whether the individual had an actual impairment, especially
in cases where job qualifications did not include special physical skills,
the burden would shift to the employer.98 The employer would thus be
forced to prove that the individual was not qualified for the job for which
the employer had rejected him. The employer would have to meet such
employers who did not receive federal financial assistance or contract with the federal
government); Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class: Redefining the
Scope of Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 107,
110 (1997) (arguing that the ADA's main purpose in Title I is to extend protection of the
Rehabilitation Act to the private sector); Hart, supra note 4, at 923-24 (pointing out that
the ADA protections are the same as those under the Rehabilitation Act, only the ADA
reaches a broader population); Henry, supra note 26, at 126 (arguing that the "most sig-
nificant difference" between the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA is the "scope of the em-
ployers covered") (emphasis added); Maureen O'Connor, Note, Defining "Handicap" for
Purposes of Employment Discrimination, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 633, 649 (1988) (arguing that,
under the Rehabilitation Act, private employers covered by Title VII, absent a state dis-
ability discrimination statute, were not "prohibited from discriminating against handi-
capped [individuals]").
96. See supra note 9 (citing legislative history that addressed the scope of what Con-
gress considered an impairment).
97. See Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244,1249 & n.5 (6th Cir. 1985).
The court reasoned that characteristics, such as height or strength, that render an individ-
ual incapable of performing a particular job, are not covered because they fail to qualify as
impairments, instead of, as the E.E. Black court said, because the individual would not be
otherwise qualified to perform the job in spite of his impairment. See id. at 1249. The
ALJ in E.E. Black drew the analogy of an individual bringing a successful discrimination
claim because he was not hired as a running back by the Dallas Cowboys football team, an
illustration intended to show the potentially absurd results of interpreting the standard for
a substantial limitation on the ability to work as the loss of a particular job as opposed to a
bar from general employability. See E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1099-
1100 (D. Haw. 1980). The district court rejected that analogy as inapposite because the
individual probably could not get the job with the Dallas Cowboys since he would not be
capable of performing it notwithstanding any physical impairment and, thus, was not oth-
erwise qualified. See id. at 1100. The court in Jasany would have said that the individual
was not handicapped because he lacked a physical impairment as defined by the regula-
tions. See Jasany, 755 F.2d at 1249.
98. See Jasany, 755 F.2d at 1249-50 & n.5.
1076 [Vol. 47:1057
Substantially Limited Under the ADA
a burden before the individual would need to prove that he was disabled
under the statute, and that he was qualified apart from his handicap. 9
More recently, the Fourth Circuit has further narrowed its definition of
impairment by reasoning that if an individual is diagnosed with a disease
such as HIV, and there is no negative physical impact on him, he may not
even be impaired within the meaning of the statute.'0° The court seems
to have reasoned that although such a diagnosis may force an individual
to make certain difficult choices based on his risk of aggravating the con-
dition, it does not physically constrain him from performing any activ-
ity.
1°1
99. See id. The burden shifting standard for disability discrimination cases is different
from the one for Title VII cases because disabled individuals are usually rejected overtly
on the basis of their disabilities, whereas those discriminated against on the basis of race,
sex, or national origin are usually presented with an alternative reason for their termina-
tion or rejection. See Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1385-87 (10th
Cir. 1981) (holding that a modification of the traditional McDonnell Douglas test for dis-
crimination was needed for handicap cases).
The McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green case established the elements required to prove
a prima facie case of Title VII racial discrimination. See 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The
plaintiff must establish:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a
job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifica-
tions, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complain-
ant's qualifications .... The burden then must shift to the employer to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.
Id. (emphasis added).
In disability discrimination cases, the express reason stated for termination or disqualifi-
cation is often the disability at issue. See Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1385-86. Therefore, as
Pushkin suggests, a disabled person should be required to prove that he is disabled, and
otherwise qualified. See id. at 1387. The burden should then shift to the employer to state
a legitimate business reason for disqualifying the employee. See id. If proved, the em-
ployee could rebut the employer's decision by proving that the rejection was unjustified
because it was based on "misconceptions or unfounded factual conclusions." Id.
100. See Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 172 (4th Cir. 1997). The
court reasoned that HIV-status alone is not a per se impairment because it does not physi-
cally inhibit either procreation or intimate relations. See id.
101. See id. The court conceded that the disease has caused many infected individuals
to refrain from procreation or intimate sexual relations, but that "reaction to the knowl-
edge of [their] infection" was not the same as physically being unable to participate in the
activity. Id. The court contrasted the "reaction" with the predicament of a paraplegic
who lacks the physical ability to walk. See id. The court considered the fundamental dif-
ference between the paraplegic and the asymptomatic HIV sufferer to be the physical bar-
rier that paralysis places between a paraplegic's desire, versus his ability, to walk. See id.
In the case of an asymptomatic HIV individual, no physically impassable barrier exists.
See id. Rather, the reaction to the disease (for example, the fear of infecting others), not
the disease standing alone, operates as the impairment. See id.
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C. Defining Major Life Activity
To further limit the scope of coverage of the ADA, Congress also cir-
cumscribed the definition of disability to include only those impairments
that restrict a major life activity. °2 The EEOC defined the phrase "major
life activity" in a way that distinguishes trivial impairments from those
that prevent truly disabled persons from performing essential functions
without significant difficulty.1 3 The EEOC categorized such activities as
walking, seeing, learning, taking care of oneself, performing manual
tasks, breathing, and working as major life activities. 1°4 It explicitly
stated, however, that this list was not exhaustive and other activities such
as lifting and standing also may be included.0  Although seemingly self-
explanatory,""' this open-ended definition has produced diametrically op-
posed court decisions for some conditions.""° For example, the issue of
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
103. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1997); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52
(1990) (stating that a parapalegic would be impaired in the major life activity of walking,
but that an inlected finger would not impair a major life activity), reprinted in 1990
U.S.S.C.A.N. 303, 334; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990) (same), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 450-51; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22-23 (1989) (same); Rogers v. Interna-
tional Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 759 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that an ability to
climb is not a major life activity); Lamury v. Boeing Co., No. 94-1225-PKF, 1995 WL
643835, at *5 (D. Kan. Oct. 5, 1995) (declining to include "'lifting, handling, pushing, pull-
ing, gripping, and grasping' as major life activities). The Lamury court reasoned that if it
allowed these activities under the statutory definition, then everything would be a major
life activity. See id.
104. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i).
105. See id.
106. See id. (defining major life activities as "those basic activities that the average
person... can perform with little or no difficulty").
107. Compare Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1404 (N.D. I11. 1994)
(holding esphofical reflux, a condition that prevents natural pregnancy, to be an impair-
ment of the major life activity of reproduction), with Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc.,
881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995) (holding that reproduction is not a major life activ-
ity), affid, 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996). But cf Deborah K. Dallmann, Note, The Lay View
of What "Disability" Means Must Give Way to What Congress Says It Means: Infertility as a
"Disability" Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 401
(1996). The author argues that Zatarain was incorrect in determining reproduction not to
be a major life activity because the court ignored "crucial aspects" of the regulations and
EEOC Interpretive Guidance as well as Rehabilitation Act precedent and procreation's
profound importance in American society. See id.
One commentator argues for the elimination of "working" as a major life activity. See
Locke, supra note 95, at 135-38. Locke suggests that inconsistent results occur when dis-
ability is measured through the spectrum of its "occupational impact" because of the indi-
vidual, and thus wide-ranging, nature of each inquiry. See id. at 136. He also argues that
courts are reluctant to find individuals disabled in their ability to work because work en-
compasses so many different activities. See id. at 138. A finding of disability would virtu-
ally ensure proof of the prima facie case every time, as no work activity would be left unaf-
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infertility has been held to be an impairment of the major life activity of
108
reproduction by one court, but not by another. The latter court rea-
soned that reproduction/pregnancy was merely a personal lifestyle
choice.' °9 Also, one court held asymptomatic HIV to be a per se impair-
ment, while another did not, because the latter court found that it did not
physically prevent the individual from performing any major life activ-
ity.1
10
D. Defining Substantially Limits
Notwithstanding the difficulties produced by the terms "impairment"
and "major life activity," the term "substantially limits" serves to decide
most disability cases at the summary judgment stage.1 The EEOC de-
fected by the impairment. See id. Thus, the employer could not show a reason for termi-
nation or disqualification that was not based on the disability. See id. This fear, Locke
argues, has resulted in an evisceration of the "working provision," and the subsequent
dismissal of potentially meritorious claims. See id.; see also EMPLOYEE RIGHTS, supra
note 5, § 3.02(3)(a), at 3-26 to 3-29 (discussing regulations and case law defining major life
activities); Lifting Is a Major Life Activity: Qualifies Individual as Disabled Under ADA,
EMPLOYMENT L. UPDATE (Rutkowski and Assoc., Inc.), Sept. 1996, at 1-2 (discussing a
Tenth Circuit case which held lifting to be a major life activity (citing Lowe v. Angelo's
Italian Foods, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1822 (10th Cir. July 2, 1996))).
108. See Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1404. The district court reasoned that since the
EEOC lited the reproductive system in its regulations as a body system vulnerable to a
physiological disorder, then logic dictated the conclusion that reproduction is a major life
activity. See id. The court cited a Seventh Circuit case which held that the Rehabilitation
Act covers reproductive systems and, therefore, reproductive activity. See id. (citing
McWright v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 222, 226-27 (7th Cir. 1992)). Since the ADA was based
on the same definitional structure, the interpretations should be substantially similar. See
id. at 1405.
109. See Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 243. The district court argued that the major life
activity affected must be "separate and distinct" from the impairment that limits it. Id.
Otherwise, the court argued, the plaintiff could "bootstrap" a major life activity onto the
impairment by making the circular argument that, since her ability to reproduce is sub-
stantially limited, it is a substantial limitation of her major life activity of reproduction. Id.
The court also argued that the generally infrequent and, impliedly, discretionary nature of
pregnancy should not be included in the list of such daily and mandatory life activities as
walking and seeing. See id.
110. Compare Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 938-40 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding HIV-
positive status, "simpliciter," to be an impairment, and because there existed a concomi-
tant substantial limitation on the major life activity of reproduction, the plaintiff's condi-
tion satisfied the definition of disability), with Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Md., 123
F.3d 156, 172 (4th Cir. 1997) (reasoning that HIV-positive status alone is not a per se im-
pairment because it does not physically inhibit either procreation or intimate relations).
111. See Robinson v. Neodata Serv., 94 F.3d 499, 501-02 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding em-
ployee with restricted arm movement was not substantially limited in a major life activity);
Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 108 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that a limp, caused by hip
surgery, is not a substantial limitation of the major life activity of walking); Dutcher v. In-
galls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 727 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that an inability to perform
one aspect of a job is not a substantial limitation on a major life activity); Vaughan v. Har-
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fined "substantially limits" as either preventing an individual from par-• 112
ticipating in a major life activity, or significantly restricting his ability to
perform one or more major life activities compared with the abilities of
an average person."3 To guide the EEOC, Congress gave an example of
a person who can walk ten miles but experiences pain in the eleventh
mile, and concluded he would not be substantially limited because the
average person would not be able to walk such a distance without also
experiencing pain."4 Other examples that help to clarify the term "aver-
age" exist in the appendix to the regulations."' For instance, a person
with extraordinary abilities who, after suffering an impairment, can per-
form only at the level of an average person, does not qualify as substan-
tially limited in that major life activity."6 The EEOC pointed out that the
focus should not be on the impairment, but rather on the effect that im-
pairment has on the individual's ability to perform essential functions."'
vard Indus., Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1340, 1347 (W.D. Tenn. 1996) (holding that lifting restric-
tions and a requirement to rest periodically do not constitute a substantial limitation of a
major life activity); Sutton v. Department of Children, Youth and Families, 922 F. Supp.
516, 519 (D.N.M. 1996) (holding that plaintiff's impairment-degenerative arthritis condi-
tion-is not a substantial limitation because the condition is unlikely to have any perma-
nent or long-term impact on a major life activity); Venclauskas v. Department of Pub.
Safety, 921 F. Supp. 78, 82 (D. Conn. 1995) (holding that plaintiff's vision impairment is
not covered under the ADA because it does not substantially limit the individual's ability
to work).
112. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (1997) (defining substantially limits as "[u]nable to
perform [an] ... activity that the average person ... can perform"). That is, he cannot
perform, or engage in, the activity at all. See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text
(discussing definition of major life activities).
113. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (defining substantially limits as "significantly re-
stricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform...
as compared to ... the average person"). That is, he can perform or engage in the activity,
but not at the skill level of the average person. See id. The EEOC states in its Interpre-
tive Guidance that "average" is not defined by mathematical calculation. See id. app.
§ 1630.20). The psychologist who invented the intelligence test, Dr. David Wechsler, sug-
gested that most of the physical and mental differences between humans "fall within a
normal range." Engh, supra note 80, at 175 (citing Earl McBride, The Classic Concept of
Disability, 221 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS AND RELATED RESEARCH 3, 7 (1987)). Thus,
wide variations in physical and mental abilities must be considered in determining the ex-
istence of a disability. See id. An individual claiming coverage must fall outside this broad
range before he can qualify for either ADA or Rehabilitation Act protection. See id.
114. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989).
115. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (providing a framework for analysis of the term
"substantially limits" and examples).
116. See id. (explaining that a once extraordinarily fast walker who suffered an im-
pairment would not be substantially limited in his major life activity of walking if he could
still walk as fast as the average person).
117. See id. The EEOC, however, does say that HIV infection is "inherently substan-
tially limiting." Id. The EEOC declared HIV to be covered based on Congress's adoption
of the Department of Justice's position that an HIV-infected person satisfies the definition
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Reinforcing Congress's intention that the Act should apply only to those
with serious illnesses or injuries, the EEOC explained that "temporary,
non-chronic impairments of short duration" are not likely to be cov-
ered.11
Like the court in E.E. Black, the EEOC concluded that whether an
impairment is substantially limiting should be determined on a case-by-
case basis, using a set of three factors to guide the analysis.119 The first
factor is the "nature and severity of the impairment. 120 Based on the
of disability under the Rehabilitation Act. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (citing U.S. De-
partment of Justice, "Application of Section 504 of The Rehabilitation Act to HIV-
Infected Individuals," at 9-11 (Sept. 27, 1988)).
Some courts have held that HIV-positive status is a disability. See Abbott v. Bragdon,
107 F.3d 934, 938-40 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding HIV-positive status, "simpliciter," to be an
"impairment," and because it causes a concomitant substantial limitation on the major life
activity of reproduction, it satisfies the definition of disability); Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf,
P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1321 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that HIV-positive status brings a
person within the coverage of the ADA). On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit recently
held that the HIV-positive status is not a per se disability. Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of
Md., 123 F.3d 156,169-70 (4th Cir. 1997). In Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Maryland, the
court held that asymptomatic HIV is not a per se disability because the regulations require
a case-by-case determination. See id. at 169. The court went even farther, reasoning that
HIV status alone was not even a per se impairment because it does not physically inhibit
either procreation or intimate relations and, therefore, could not substantially limit those
activities. See id. at 172; see also supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text (discussing the
rationale behind why asymptomatic HIV status is not a per se impairment).
118. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j). Following this guidance, courts have held that
pregnancy, standing alone, is not an impairment because of its temporary duration. See
Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 473 (D. Kan. 1996) (hold-
ing "normal pregnancy" is not an impairment under the ADA); Villarreal v. J.E. Merit
Constructors, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 149, 152 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (holding pregnancy, absent un-
usual circumstances, is not an impairment); Tsetseranos v. Tech Prototype, Inc., 893 F.
Supp. 109, 119 (D.N.H. 1995) (same). But see Chapsky v. Baxter V. Mueuller Div., No.
93-6524, 1995 WL 103299, at *3 (N.D. I11. Mar. 9, 1995) (determining that pregnancy is
considered a disability under the ADA). In reaching its conclusion, the court in Chapsky
relied primarily on the Pacourek court's determination that the reproductive system is an
impairment that affects both major life activities and life in general. See id. It is arguable
that the Chapsky court read Pacourek too broadly because it interpreted reproduction to
include all pregnancy, normal and medically complicated, which simply is not the case.
See Wenzlaff v. Nationsbank, 940 F. Supp. 889, 891 (D. Md. 1996) (stating that "Chapsky's
reading of Pacourek is questionable at best").
119. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j); supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text (deline-
ating the factors for determining an impairment); see also Kelly, 94 F.3d at 106-07.
120. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i) (1997). Congress did not intend the ADA to cover mi-
nor impairments. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989) (stating that a finger infection
would not qualify as a statutory impairment). This factor, however, is only one to con-
sider, and each case must be decided individually. See Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. &
Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 59 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that the ADA requires an indi-
vidualized determination of disability status); Barfield v. Bell S. Telecomm., Inc., 886 F.
Supp. 1321, 1324 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (requiring that disability determinations be made on a
case-by-case basis, considering the nature and severity, duration, and permanent or long-
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legislative history121 and the explanations in the regulations,"' this factor
appears to eliminate coverage for trivial injuries that Congress did not
intend to protect.123 Courts have been relatively strict, but not uniform,
in their application of this factor.1 4 Some courts have rejected claims
that involve actual impairments after finding that the impairments are
not severe enough to be considered substantial limitations of major life
activities; these impairments do not cause individuals more difficulty in
performing specific tasks than average people."'
The EEOC's second factor is the "duration or expected duration of the
impairment. 1 26 Temporary injuries, such as broken bones, absent some
long term complications, will likely be considered of insufficient duration
127to qualify as substantial limitations on major life activities. Courts
evaluating this factor have set a high standard for showing the requisite
impairment, holding such impairments as back injuries, that limit the
ability to lift and bend, and joint injuries that restrict the ability to walk
and climb, not to be substantially limiting enough to qualify for coverage
under the Act.
128
term impact of the impairment); see also EMPLOYEE RIGHTS, supra note 5, § 3.02(3)(b), at
3-31 (arguing that determination of substantial limitation cannot be made in the abstract).
121. See generally H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 48-53 (1990) (discussing parameters
of change), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, 27-31 (1990)
(same), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 1-21 (same).
122. See generally 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. (providing interpretive guidance).
123. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (stating that the Act was not intended to protect
"minor, trivial impairments").
124. See Robinson v. Neodata Serv., Inc., 94 F.3d 499, 501-02 (8th Cir. 1996) (deter-
mining that an employee's six percent impairment in the use of her upper arm was too mi-
nor to constitute a disability under the ADA); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 108 (3d
Cir. 1996) (holding that no substantial limit on walking existed where employee's hip in-
jury did not require him to use prosthetic devices, notwithstanding the fact that he had a
permanent limp and significant pain when he walked). But see Gilday v. Mecosta County,
124 F.3d 760, 765 (6th Cir. 1997) (recognizing untreated diabetes, which prevented an em-
ployee from getting along with others at work, as a substantial limitation on his ability to
work).
125. See Kelly, 94 F.3d at 106-07 (discussing the EEOC Compliance Manual guidance,
and noting that moderate difficulties in walking should not be considered substantial im-
pairments); Nedder v. Rivier College, 944 F. Supp. 111, 117 (D.N.H. 1996) (holding the
plaintiff's obesity, which prevented her from walking as swiftly as the average person, and
required significant physical exertion to walk at all, was not substantially limiting); Graver
v. National Eng'g Co., No. 94 C 1228, 1995 WL 443944, at *11 (N.D. I11. July 25, 1995)
(holding that, although plaintiff walked with a noticeable limp, he was not substantially
limited in his ability to walk).
126. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii).
127. See id. app. § 1630.20) (noting that "a broken leg that takes eight weeks to heal is
an impairment of fairly brief duration").
128. See Rogers v. International Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 759 (5th Cir.
1996) (holding correctable ankle difficulties were not a substantial impairment, even
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The final factor is the "permanent or long term impact, or the expected
permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment."'29
This impact factor allows individuals who suffer impairments, which are
not in themselves substantially limiting due to the impairments' lack of
severity or duration, to obtain protection based on manifested difficulties
from the primary injury or illness that are sufficiently restricting to qual-
ify the individual for coverage.13° The impact itself also must be suffi-
ciently severe and of permanent or long-term duration before an individ-
ual may obtain coverage."3 Furthermore, the impact must be a
manifestation of an actual impairment." For example, a broken leg
which heals properly would probably have little, if any, long term im-
pact."'33 If, however, the leg heals improperly and creates a permanent
limp, the individual may qualify for coverage.134
though following surgery the individual still had a 13% permanent, partial disability, be-
cause the therapist determined there was no limitation on the employee's ability to per-
form his duties); Presutti v. Felton Brush, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 545, 549 (D.N.H. 1995) (hold-
ing temporary back injury which resulted in seven weeks of absence from work was not a
substantial limitation).
129. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(iii).
130. See id. app. § 1630.2(j) (explaining that an improperly healed broken leg or a cog-
nitive disability resulting from a serious accident would be considered the impact neces-
sary for coverage); Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 944 n.3 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting
that evidence of plaintiff's ability to return to work without limitations, seven to nine
months following injury, undermined his ADA claim because the impact was neither
"long term" nor severe); see also Richard H. Nakamura, Jr., Pride and Prejudice in the
Workplace: Can the ADA Split the Difference Without Splitting Hairs?, 43 FED. LAW. 22,
25 (1996) (explaining that an individual must be disabled enough to obtain coverage and
suggesting the analysis used in Bolton as the model for a court analyzing this factor) (citing
Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939 (10th Cir. 1994))).
131. See Rogers, 87 F.3d at 759 (noting therapist's statement that Rogers's impairment
would not restrict him in any of his pre-surgery activities in finding no substantial impair-
ment).
132. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) ("[T]he restriction on the performance of the major
life activity must be the result of a condition that is an impairment.").
133. See id.; see also Rogers, 87 F.3d at 759 (holding that a surgically correctable, tem-
porary ankle injury was not a substantial impairment to the appellant's ability to walk).
134. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20). But see Rogers, 87 F.3d at 759 (reasoning that
since employee could still perform most duties, he was not substantially limited); Blanton
v. Winston Printing Co., 868 F. Supp. 804, 807 (M.D.N.C. 1994) (holding plaintiff's post-
injury condition to be "nearly as good as" pre-injury, and, therefore, not substantially lim-
iting).
The injury standing on its own may be of too short a duration to be deemed substantial;
however, the employer's attitude toward the employee's ability may create eligibility. See
Spath v. Berry Plastics Corp., 900 F. Supp. 893, 903 & n.9 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (holding that a
broken ankle was a disability because that employer regarded the employee as having a
substantial limitation on her ability to walk).
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Thus, even if a person is substantially limited in a major life activity
such as walking or learning,"' unless that limitation is the result of an
"impairment," the individual is not protected.36 Also, to meet the re-
quirement of a substantial limitation on a major life activity, the court
must determine that the impairment is severe enough'3 7 and is of suffi-
cient duration with a corresponding impact "8 before it will find a disabil-
ity. The EEOC draws an analytical distinction for the substantial im-
pairment in the major life activity of working in that it is only evaluated
once an individual fails to prove his impairment substantially limits any
other major life activity.39
135. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
136. See id. app. § 1630.20) (explaining that if someone cannot read because of a cul-
tural factor, which is not an impairment, then he is not covered, but he would be covered if
the inability to read was caused by dyslexia).
137. See id. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i). Neither the regulations nor the Interpretive Guidance
establish a benchmark of severity, but rather suggest all factors be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis. See id. app. § 1630.20). Although the EEOC generally declined to set static
bases for qualification, a quasi-common law threshold appears to be developing for
weight-lifting restrictions. See Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d
346, 349 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding a 25-pound lifting restriction not sufficiently limiting to
obtain coverage under the ADA), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 1844 (1997) ; Aucutt v. Six Flags
over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding 25-pound lifting re-
striction not to be a disability); Ray v. Glidden, Co. 85 F.3d 227, 229 (5th Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing inability to continuously lift 44- to 56-pound containers throughout the workday not to
constitute a severe impairment when compared to the average person in the general
populace). But see Frix v. Florida Tile Indus., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1027, 1034 (N.D. Ga.
1997) (holding that a 25-pound lifting restriction is a disability under the ADA).
138. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii), (iii). These factors must be evaluated on a case-
by-case basis. See id. app. § 1630.20); supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing duration and impact of impairment).
139. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20); see also Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans With
Disabilities Act Interpreting the Title I Regulations: The Hard Cases, 2 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 1, 3 (1992) (hypothesizing that an individual suffering from mild seizures
would have to prove a substantial limitation on his ability to work because none of "his
other everyday activities" would be similarly affected).
The EEOC treats work separately because it is not a basic life-functioning task, but
rather a combination of those tasks at a higher level of performance, such as repetitive
tasks like typing. See Locke, supra note 95, at 115 & n.44. The working activity poten-
tially brings under the Act's coverage many impairments that are not severe enough to
hinder a basic major life activity, but do have a severe impact on daily functions. See id.;
James M. Zappa, Note, The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990: Improving Judicial
Determinations of Whether an Individual Is "Substantially Limited," 75 MINN. L. REV.
1303, 1334 (1991) (pointing out that the major life activity of work encompasses multiple
tasks and activities that must be performed even if that individual is not working). Zappa
argues that courts should consider the limitation on an individual's ability to work in gen-
eral, such as the ability to perform those activities generally involved in work. See id. If a
court finds an individual impaired in his ability to engage in activities associated with
working in general, Zappa argues, it should determine that disability coverage exists. See
id. at 1335.
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E. Defining the Major Life Activity of Working
1. EEOC Factors
The EEOC says that the activity of working should be considered only
if an individual cannot demonstrate substantial limitation in another
major life activity, because if an individual is substantially limited in a
major life activity, such as walking or seeing, then a fortiori he is also
substantially limited in his ability to work.14 0 The EEOC states that an
individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of working
when he is barred from "either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in
various classes" in comparison with an average person of "comparable
training, skills and abilities.' 4' The regulation specifically excludes the
"inability to perform a single, particular job" from the definition.' As
140. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20). By separating consideration of the major life ac-
tivity of work, Congress evidently recognized the difficult task of identifying a work im-
pairment. See Locke, supra note 95, at 116 (pointing out the lack of a "universal under-
standing" of the definition of a work impairment). The EEOC Interpretive Guidance
specifically says that the list of major life activities is not exhaustive; thus, potentially dis-
abled plaintiffs have extensive latitude in proving that major life activities other than work
are substantially limited. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i). Therefore, working should be
considered only when an individual cannot show another activity is substantially limited.
See Locke, supra note 95, at 116.
141. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(i).
142. Id. This prohibition prevents the absurd result warned against in E.E. Black in
which a person being offered employment at multiple locations, but unable to work at one
location due to his impairment, obtained coverage under the Act. See E.E. Black, Ltd. v.
Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1099 (D. Haw. 1980). The rejected or terminated individual,
however, is not necessarily without protection from the single-instance discriminator. The
EEOC Interpretive Guidance states that if he is regarded as disabled by an employer
based on societal myths, fears, and stereotypes, he is not bound by the requirement of be-
ing disqualified from multiple jobs before obtaining coverage. See 29 C.F.R. app.
§ 1630.2(1). The EEOC states further that employers erect "common attitudinal barriers"
against the disabled, resulting in discriminatory practices. See id. Therefore, says the
EEOC, an inference of discrimination is drawn when an employer bases its decision on a
perception founded in "'myth, fear, or stereotype."' See id. Courts, however, have not
necessarily agreed with the EEOC's guidance. See Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329,
332 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct 770 (1997). In Bridges, the court evaluated the
plaintiff's claim under the "regarded as" prong, but still imposed the requirement that he
be disqualified from a "'class of jobs' or "'broad range of jobs in various classes."' See id.
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(i)).
For commentary on this subject, see Arlene Mayerson, Title I-Employment Provisions
of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 499, 507-08 & nn.59, 60 (1991)
(arguing that the "regarded as" prong of the disability definition is satisfied when an em-
ployer rejects an individual from a single job); see also Haines, supra note 20, at 545-46
(arguing that, under certain circumstances, the denial of or termination from a single job
would fall within the confines of a substantial limit on the ability to work). Haines focuses
particularly on the employee's desired occupation, concluding that rejection from that job
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with other major life activities, the EEOC again suggests a case-by-case
analysis; it provides three factors, in addition to those discussed above,
which a court "may" use in making its determination."' These factors
are similar to the ones used by the district court in E.E. Black.'"
The first factor is "[t]he geographical area to which the individual has
reasonable access. 1 45 The EEOC does not give any examples of this fac-
tor, but its reference to E.E. Black14' and its earlier statement that it
would look to Rehabilitation Act cases47 allows the inference that the
example given in E.E. Black is apposite.
The second factor addresses the term "class of jobs."' 49 Specifically,
the EEOC says that the court may consider not only the particular job
from which the individual is barred as a result of his impairment, but also
other jobs within a reasonably accessible distance that utilize similar
manual, vocational, or professional skills, and from which the individual
also is barred as a result of his impairment.5 ' The Interpretive Guidance
provides an example of an individual with a back injury who could not
perform heavy lifting,' and, as such, would be barred from the class of
jobs that requires heavy lifting.'52 If the individual is barred from a class
creates a substantial limitation on the ability to be employed in the job of one's choice.
See Haines, supra note 20, at 546. But see E.E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1099 (rejecting the
position later advanced by Haines).
143. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii). When referring to the factors for determin-
ing whether other major life activities are substantially limited, the EEOC uses the term
"should," not "may," suggesting a stronger intent to influence the court's analysis. See id.
§ 1630.20)(2), (j)(3)(ii).
144. See E.E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1100-01; supra notes 34-60 and accompanying text
(discussing the decision in E.E. Black and the factors delineated by the court for deter-
mining coverage under the Rehabilitation Act).
145. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A).
146. See id. app. § 1630.20).
147. See id. app. § 1630.2(g).
148. See E.E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1101 ("It is irrelevant that a similar job could be
obtained in Kansas City if the applicant lives in San Diego.").
149. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (defining substantially limits in the context of
working as the "ability to perform.., a class of jobs").
150. See id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B).
151. See id. app. § 1630.20). It is important to note that the Interpretive Guidance
represents the EEOC's "interpretation of the issues discussed" in the appendix to the
regulations. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,726 (1991) (presenting an overview of the regula-
tions). The EEOC's guidance is "not controlling upon the courts by reason of their
authority." General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (quoting Skid-
more v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). The Appendix, however, "[does] consti-
tute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may prop-
erly resort for guidance." Id.
152. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20). If the individual could not perform heavy labor
jobs, he would not be required to show that he was barred from all other vocations before
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of jobs, the EEOC will consider the individual disabled, even if he could
perform jobs in a different class, such as in the class of semi-skilled jobs.
The third factor addresses the term "broad range of jobs." '153 The
analysis is the same as the analysis for a class of jobs, except that it fo-
cuses on those jobs which do not involve similar manual, vocational, or
professional skills, but from which the individual also is barred as a result
of his impairment.' The EEOC gives the example of an individual who
is allergic to some substance only found in high-rise office buildings that
makes his breathing extremely difficult.'55 In this case, he would be un-
able, without extreme difficulty, to work in high-rise office buildings and,
thus, would be substantially limited in his ability to perform a broad
range of jobs-those in high-rise office buildings.' Therefore, he wouldbe considered disabled under the ADA.157
he qualified as disabled. See id.
153. See id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
154. See id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(C). The Interpretive Guidance attempts to clarify the
term "class of jobs" by defining it as one in which the individual is disqualified because his
impairment hampers his ability to perform an essential job function involved in a category
of jobs such as heavy labor. See id. app. § 1630.2(j). On the other hand, it illustrates the
concept of a "broad range of jobs" through the example of an individual who is disquali-
fied from all jobs in high-rise office buildings because of an allergy that only exists in those
locations. See id. This individual is disqualified from any job that exists in an environment
which aggravates his impairment, regardless of its essential functions, or stated differently,
he is impaired with respect to a "broad range of jobs in various classes." See id.
This analysis requires a quantitative measurement by the court of the number of jobs
from which the individual is actually or potentially disqualified as a result of his impair-
ment. See Locke, supra note 95, at 117 (arguing the test is premised on a quantitative
analysis). Locke argues that this test has resulted in more confusion, rather than clarifica-
tion, because of the difficulty in determining what is meant by a class or broad range. See
id. at 118. Indeed, in Professor Haines's 1983 article on the E.E. Black case, he criticized
the quantitative analytical method as oversimplified and improperly focused. See Haines,
supra note 20, at 545. Professor Haines argued that a quantitative analysis eased the em-
ployer's burden of identifying disabled persons, but created "objectionable statutory am-
biguities" by creating a necessary exclusion for disabled persons only disqualified from
one job, which seems to contravene the Rehabilitation Act's stated broad purpose. Id.
This confusion and a potential solution are discussed infra at Parts III and IV of this
Comment.
155. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j).
156. See id.
157. See id. His disability would be a substantial limitation on his ability to work in a
"broad range of jobs in various classes." Id.; see also supra notes 153-57 and accompanying
text (discussing the definition of "broad range"). Compare Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc.,
893 F. Supp. 1092, 1100-01 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (holding that plaintiff's sedentary condition
was a substantial limit because it disqualified him from 90% of all jobs), with Williams v.
City of Charlotte, 899 F. Supp. 1484, 1488 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (holding that plaintiff's dis-
qualification from 12.8% of all jobs and 50% of jobs in her field was not a substantial limi-
tation because it was not significant, yet acknowledging a barrier to employment did ex-
ist).
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2. The Majority Interpretation of the Definitions
Many courts analyzing ADA claims have read the Act narrowly and
have dismissed these claims on the bases that the plaintiff was not "dis-
abled" as that term is defined in the statute.58 Some courts, however,
have reached divergent results based on a broader reading of the stat-
ute.159 The Eighth Circuit, representing the prevailing view, strictly in-
terpreted the Act when it denied a claim in Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-
America, Inc."6  The plaintiff was a security guard at an amusement
park. '6 One of the requirements was to complete a streams course.' 62
Aucutt suffered from angina, high blood pressure, and coronary heartd. 163
disease. After a short stay in the hospital, his physician put him on a
twenty-five pound lifting restriction.' 64  He could not complete the
streams course without suffering extreme pain.16' Aucutt was fired dur-
ing a reduction in force, and subsequently sued based on a claim that he
had been discriminated against because of, among other things, his dis-
ability.
166
In holding that Aucutt was not disabled under the ADA, the court re-
lied on the terms provided by the EEOC when defining "major life ac-
tivity of working" 167 and "class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
158. See Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir.
1996) (holding that a 25-pound lifting restriction did not substantially impair an individ-
ual's ability to work), Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 190-91 (5th Cir.
1996) (holding that plaintiff's breast cancer, though causing nausea and fatigue, and af-
fecting her job, was not serious enough to trigger coverage of the Act).
159. See Frix v. Florida Tile Indus., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1027, 1034 (N.D. Ga. 1997)
(holding plaintiff's lifting restriction prevented him from performing heavy labor jobs, thus
barring him from a class of jobs and qualifying his condition as disabling in that it substan-
tially limited his major life activity of working); Keller v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co.,
881 F. Supp. 1559, 1563 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (holding that heart disease qualifies as a disabil-
ity under the ADA).
160. 85 F.3d 1311, 1314 (8th Cir. 1996).
161. See id.
162. See id. The streams course was a required obstacle course for all security em-
ployees. See id.
163. See id. Aucutt spent time in the hospital and was treated for high blood pressure
after becoming ill at work. See id.
164. See id. He stayed in the hospital only a few days, but was not released to return
to work for three weeks. See id.
165. See id. Six Flags was aware of Aucutt's pain, and had previously denied him use
of a vehicle for patrolling on hot days. See id.
166. See id. Two other security officers were terminated during the restructuring. See
id. Six Flags cited Aucutt's abuse of park patrons as the reason for selecting him to be
terminated; he made some patrons do push-ups, and, without authorization, searched ve-
hicles for alcohol. See id.
167. Id. at 1319. The court reasoned that Aucutt's failure to produce evidence of how
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classes.''1  In a statement that sounded very similar to the AL's rea-nl 169
soning in E.E. Black, however, the court observed that Aucutt's condi-
tion did not "limit[] his overall employment opportunities."""
The Fifth Circuit in Bridges v. City of Bossier took a similarly broad
view of the employment opportunities that must be barred before an in-
dividual qualifies for coverage.17' The plaintiff in Bridges was rejected for
a position as a firefighter because he suffered from a mild form of hemo-
philia.'72 Bridges claimed that the City rejected him because it believed
him to be a high risk, which placed him within the "regarded as" prong of
disability coverage under the ADA.173 The district court found, and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed, that his disqualification from positions requiring
"'routine exposure to extreme trauma"' did not substantially limit his
his heart condition restricted his ability to obtain employment sufficed to dismiss his mo-
tion in opposition to summary judgment. See id. The court discounted both Aucutt's pain
in completing the streams course and his 25-pound lifting restriction as insignificant limita-
tions on his ability to work. See id.
168. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i); see also supra notes 149-57 and accompanying text
(describing "class" and "broad range" concepts). In Aucutt, the court did not attempt any
significant definition of these terms, but merely stated them as criteria and concluded that
the plaintiff failed to satisfy either one. 85 F.3d at 1319. The court did cite to Bolton v.
Scrivner, Inc., but only for the proposition that the plaintiff in that case also failed to pro-
duce evidence of his inability to "'perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in
various classes."' See id. (citing Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 942-44 (10th Cir.
1994)).
169. See E.E. Black v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1100 (D. Haw. 1980) ("'[T]hey are
not [disabled] within the meaning of the statutory definition because their respective im-
pairments are not likely to affect their employability generally, measured against the full
spectrum of possible employments."' (second emphasis added)).
170. Aucutt, 85 F.3d at 1319. The court did not discuss its reasons for concluding that
his heart condition and lifting restriction were "hardly" substantial limitations. Id. In-
stead, it cited Bolton v. Scrivner which held that the loss of a particular job did not create a
substantial limitation on the ability to work as it represented neither a "class" nor a
"broad range" of occupations. Id. (citing Bolton, 36 F.3d at 943).
171. Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329 (5th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 770
(1997).
172. Id. at 331. The court held that jobs which require "routine exposure to extreme
trauma" encompass a "narrow range" and, therefore, do not qualify for coverage. See id.
at 334. The City considered Bridges a high risk of harm to himself, as well as other fire-
fighters. See id. at 331.
173. See id. Bridges claimed that he was generally unimpeded by his hemophilia, evi-
denced by his participation in high school sports, his occupation as an Emergency Medical
Technician, and his service in the Louisiana National Guard. See id. He further claimed
that the City, in making its decision not to hire him, failed to determine his risk of injury
based on an "individualized assessment," but instead relied on "myths, fears, and stereo-
types." Id. On the other hand, the City claimed that, although it rejected him based on his
impairment, he did not qualify as disabled "as that term [was] defined under the ADA."
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ability to work.174  The court reasoned that the category from which
Bridges was disqualified represented only a "narrow range of jobs," and,
therefore, could not qualify him for coverage under the ADA.
175
3. The Minority Interpretation of the Definitions
In rather stark contrast to the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of dis-
ability in Aucutt, as well as a majority of other circuits that have consid-
ered the question, the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Georgia in Frix v. Florida Tile Industries, Inc.'76 held that a lifting
restriction was a disability under the ADA."' Robert Frix worked as astoreroom coordinator in the maintenance department of a tile pro-
174. Id. The district court reasoned that Bridges was excluded only from jobs which
required "'routine exposure to extreme trauma,"' and that this category constituted a
"narrow range of jobs." Id. The court of appeals affirmed this logic, based in large part
on a Tenth Circuit decision, Welsh v. City of Tulsa, in which the court held the occupation
of firefighter did not establish a class of jobs for Rehabilitation Act purposes. See id. at
335-36 (citing Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1416-20 (10th Cir. 1992)).
175. Bridges, 92 F.3d at 334. The court cited with approval the conclusion drawn by
the Second Circuit that disqualification from the job of police officer represented only a
narrow range of jobs; the rejection from a firefighter's job, even if it included backup fire-
fighter jobs, was essentially the same case. See id. (citing Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215
(2d Cir. 1989)). The court rejected arguments by Bridges and amicus curiae that disquali-
fication from one's chosen field created a substantial limit on the ability to work. See id.
It instead cited a Tenth Circuit case that held a firefighter's job did not constitute a "class
of jobs." Id. at 335 (citing Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1416-20 (10th Cir. 1992)).
The court also rejected the contention that firefighters and backup firefighters constituted
a "broad range of jobs in various classes." Id. at 334 (citing the EEOC regulations for the
proposition that a "broad range" implied more than two job types).
In another Fifth Circuit case, the court rejected an individual's claim of disability, hold-
ing that her impairment only prevented her from performing a particular job, and not a
"class" or "broad range" of jobs. See Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 53 F.3d 723,
727 (5th Cir. 1995). In Dutcher, the plaintiff suffered a gun-related injury that limited her
ability to climb and perform the welding work needed by her employer. Id. at 724-25. Her
employer, following a reduction in force, refused to reinstate her into a non-climbing job
that she previously held. See id. at 725. She claimed discrimination under the ADA based
on this refusal. See id.
The Fifth Circuit analyzed her claim first as a substantial limit on a major life activity,
then as a substantial limit on the major life activity of work. See id. at 726-27. Finding that
she could perform all essential daily functions such as grocery shopping, driving, personal
hygiene, etc., it held that she was not disabled in any major life activity other than work-
ing. See id. at 726. In rejecting her disability claim under the working activity, the court
reasoned that her inability to climb was only one aspect of a job and did not prevent her
from welding in general. See id. at 727. Therefore, she was barred from no more than a
"'narrow range of jobs,"' and could not qualify for coverage under the Act. See id. (quot-
ing Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 775 F.2d 1244, 1249 n.3 (6th Cir. 1985)).
176. 970 F. Supp. 1027 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
177. See id. at 1034.
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ducer's warehouse.178 His job involved heavy lifting on a regular basis,
and he sustained an injury to his back which ultimately resulted in a lift-
ing restriction of twenty-five pounds."' He claimed he was fired because
his injury prevented him from doing heavy lifting.'O
Although the court ultimately found for the defendant, Florida Tile
Industries,' it found first that Frix was disabled under the ADA. 2 The
court cited the EEOC regulations regarding substantial limitation as its
model for assessing Frix's claim of disability."' The court flatly rejected
the interpretation of many courts that a lifting restriction was not sub-
stantially limiting because it only barred an individual from a "narrow
range of jobs."' ' 4 Instead, the court took literally the example provided
in the Interpretive Guidance accompanying the EEOC regulations de-
fining disability.' The court held that since Frix's condition prevented
178. See id. at 1030. Frix was responsible for issuing, receiving, and storing machine
parts inventory, and was therefore required to pry open crates with crow-bars and lift mo-
tors weighing between 25 and 150 pounds. See id.
179. See id. at 1030-31. Frix initially suffered a herniated disc and was placed on a
temporary 20-pound lifting restriction. See id. at 1030. He later had surgery and, although
it was deemed successful, was placed under a permanent 25-pound lifting restriction. See
id. at 1031.
180. See id. at 1029, 1033. When Frix could no longer work in the storeroom, his em-
ployer placed him in a desk job preparing computer reports. See id. at 1032. Florida Tile
eventually laid him off because the reports it needed required a higher level of sophistica-
tion, and Frix refused additional training. See id.
181. See id. at 1038. Although Frix was disabled, he rebuffed his employer's attempts
to reasonably accommodate him by refusing computer training; instead he demanded that
the employer discharge another employee so that he could continue working in a lower-
skill level position. See id. The court found that this demand was unreasonable under the
Act. See id.
182. See id. at 1034.
183. See id. at 1033; supra notes 111-39 and accompanying text (describing EEOC
regulations relating to substantial limitations).
184. See Frix, 970 F. Supp. at 1033-34; see also Williams v. Channel Master Satellite
Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that a 25-pound lifting restriction was
not a substantial limitation on a major life activity, "particularly when compared to an av-
erage person's abilities"), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1844 (1997); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over
Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding 25-pound lifting restriction
not to be a substantial limitation on a major life activity); Ray v. Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227,
229 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding a lifting restriction that prevented repetitious lifting of con-
tainers was not a substantial limitation on a major life activity); Wooten v. Farmland
Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 384, 386 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that a light-duty restriction and 20-
pound lifting restriction did not substantially limit the major life activity of working).
185. See Frix, 970 F. Supp. at 1034; 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1997); see also supra
notes 140-42 and accompanying text (discussing the EEOC example of what constitutes
disability).
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him from performing heavy labor jobs, which the EEOC guidelines de-. . 186
scribed as a "class of jobs," Frix satisfied that part of the definition.
The Eleventh Circuit also has taken a different approach to the defini-
tion of disability from the narrow view enunciated by the Bridges court."
In Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta,' the court found a firefighter's position
would probably represent a class of jobs, as opposed to a narrow range of
jobs, and thus meet the requirement for coverage under the Act."' A
group of firefighters that suffered from a skin condition which prevented
them from shaving regularly, and thus, violating the City's "no-beard
rule," claimed they were discriminated against under the Rehabilitation
Act.9' The district court rejected their claim on the ground that they
were not disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, and that,
assuming they were, there was no reasonable accommodation the City
could provide for their condition.1 91 The Eleventh Circuit agreed that the
City could not reasonably accommodate the condition because of legiti-
mate safety and technology limitations in the use of the respirators.192 It
disagreed, however, with the district court's reasoning that the firefight-
ers were not handicapped individuals.93 The court cited the definitions
186. See Frix, 970 F. Supp. at 1034. The court buttressed its reasoning by pointing out
that Frix would be unable to lift objects at other employers' facilities and thus was not
merely barred from a particular job at a particular location. See id. Further, the court rea-
soned, Frix's injury was permanent, a critical component in satisfying the disability defini-
tion. See id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii) (stating that a factor to be considered in
determining disability includes "[t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment").
187. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1126 (11th Cir. 1993) (reasoning, in
dicta, that disqualification from a firefighter's job would qualify the claimants as "handi-
capped individual[s]").
188. 2 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 1993).
189. Id. at 1126 (stating that "it appears probable... that the district court erred inso-
far as it indicated that the firefighters do not qualify as 'handicapped individuals').
190. See id. at 1114. The' firefighters were removed from duty because the City deter-
mined that they could not maintain even a shadow beard and safely wear the respirators
required to be worn during a fire. See id.
191. See id. at 1126-27. The district court based its decision to grant summary judg-
ment on two grounds. See id. at 1126. First, it doubted that the skin condition was an ac-
tual physical impairment or, if so, that it prevented the firefighters from complying with
the no-beard rule by prohibiting shaving, and thus was not a substantial limitation on their
ability to work as firefighters. See id. Second, the court found that the firefighters could
not show a reasonably accommodating method by which they could safely perform their
duties, because if they could not comply with the no-beard rule, they could not wear the
protective masks required for entry into smoke-filled structures. See id.
192. See id. at 1126-27.
193. See id. at 1126. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred by con-
cluding the firefighters were not handicapped, but that the ultimate holding to grant sum-
mary judgment was correct because the inability to shave, caused by the skin condition,
was a substantial limitation on their major life activity of working as firefighters, but no
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for physical impairment and major life activities and found that the skin
disorder qualified as a physiological disorder.9 Because it prevented the
claimants from engaging in the occupation of firefighter, the condition
substantially limited their ability to work.'9' Implicit in the court's con-
clusion is a rejection of the reasoning later adopted by the Bridges court,
that the inability to work in the occupation "of one's choice" does not
disqualify an individual from a "class of jobs.,
196
Although the Aucutt and Bridges view is more prevalent, the Frix and
Fitzpatrick"' decisions emphasize that there still is a divergence of phi-
losophy as to when an individual is substantially limited in his ability to
198work. The next part of this Comment points out the strengths and
weaknesses of the two approaches, as well as offers a potential solution.
II. TOWARD MORE PRINCIPLED DECISIONMAKING WHILE HONORING
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
A. The Majority Approach Lacks a Solid Analytical Foundation
Courts, such as the Eighth Circuit in Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-
America, Inc.'9 and the Fifth Circuit in Bridges v. City of Bossier,200 re-
reasonable accommodation existed at that time. See id.
194. See id. at 1125-26.
195. See id. (citing U.S. Department of Health and Human Services regulations, 45
C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1996)).
196. See Bridges v City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 334-35 (5th Cir. 1996) (considering and
rejecting the argument that disqualification from one's "chosen field" is disqualification
from a "class of jobs"), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997).
197. See Frix v. Florida Tile Indus., Inc., 970 F.Supp. 1027, 1033 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (con-
ceding that a "growing body of case law" interprets a lifting restriction as only precluding
employment in a "narrow range of jobs," and citing cases in support); Locke, supra note
95, at 121-22 (arguing that there is a growing trend to reject claims of substantial limita-
tions on the major life activity of work); Wilkinson, supra note 22, at 916-31 (arguing that
courts use judicial estoppel to dismiss most claims of a substantial limitation on the ability
to work).
198. See supra notes 176-96 and accompanying text (discussing the Frix and Fitzpatrick
interpretations of the definition of substantial limitation of working). Compare Bridges,
92 F.3d at 335-36 (holding an inability to perform firefighting jobs bars only a narrow
range of jobs, and thus does not qualify as a disability), and Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212,
215 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that a bar from becoming a police officer, due to a perceived
impairment, only represented a bar from a narrow range of jobs), with Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d
at 1126 (arguing, in dicta, that the inability to be a firefighter because of a skin condition
was a substantial limitation on the ability to work), and E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F.
Supp. 1088, 1101-02 (D. Haw. 1980) (stating that foreclosure from an entire field-carpen-
try-would qualify as a substantial limitation on the major life activity of work).
199. 85 F.3d 1311 (8th Cir. 1996); see also supra notes 160-70 and accompanying text
(discussing Aucutt).
200. 92 F.3d 329, 333 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding a hemophiliac's disqualification from
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jected claims of disability because they found plaintiffs were not substan-
tially limited in their major life activities of working.' The courts' con-
clusions seem to comport with congressional and EEOC intent.20 2 In
both situations, however, a different court evaluating a similar, if not
identical, set of facts reached the opposite conclusion, that a lifting re-
striction did substantially impair a major life activity0 3 and that a fire-
fighter's job could represent a class of jobs.204 This divergence of opinion
is a bane to employers attempting to comply with the provisions of the
Act because they cannot adjust their policies to comport with the Act
and its regulations when there are two, diametrically opposed, interpre-
tations of what the Act and the regulations require.
In cases like Aucutt and Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, the courts
point to the plaintiff's failure to produce evidence of a substantial limita-
tion as one of the reasons for dismissing the complaint at the summary
207judgment stage. Indeed, it is well settled that the plaintiff in an ADA
case bears a heavier burden of proving coverage under the Act than
plaintiffs in Title VII cases.0 Since ADA claims are to be decided on a
jobs involving routine exposure to trauma was not an impairment of the major life activity
of working because they only represented a "narrow range of jobs").
201. See supra notes 160-70 and accompanying text (discussing Aucutt); supra notes
171-75 and accompanying text (discussing Bridges).
202. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989) (stating that the ADA only covers impair-
ments which hinder an individual's ability to perform major life functions as compared "to
most people"); EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, § 902.8(f) (1995) (stating that an individ-
ual precluded from a "narrow range of jobs" would not obtain coverage under the Act).
203. See Frix v. Florida Tile Indus., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1027, 1034 (N.D. Ga. 1997); su-
pra notes 176-86 and accompanying text (discussing Frix).
204. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1126 (11th Cir. 1993) (assuming, in
dicta, that the inability to be a firefighter would be a substantial limitation in the major life
activity of working); supra notes 187-96 and accompanying text (discussing Fitzpatrick).
205. See Locke, supra note 95, at 118 (arguing that the attempt by the EEOC to define
a substantial limitation of the major life activity of working has caused confusion and left
the courts to develop the definition through litigation); David L. Ryan, Americans With
Disabilities: The Legal Revolution, J. KAN. BAR ASs'N Nov. 1991, at 13, 14 (stating that
the courts' track record of inconsistent interpretation of definitions under the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973 places employers at risk of misunderstanding the rules, and consequently
does not help "integrat[e] the disabled"). But see Hart, supra note 4, at 945 (arguing that
courts have already "clarified" the definition of disability through their interpretation of
the Rehabilitation Act, and, thus, prevented an increase in litigation caused by confusion).
206. 53 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 1995).
207. See Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1318-19 (8th Cir.
1996) (agreeing with the district court's holding that Aucutt failed to produce evidence
sufficient to survive summary judgment on the issue of whether his condition substantially
impaired a major life activity); Dutcher, 53 F.3d at 727 (concluding that Dutcher's failure
to produce evidence of a substantial limitation of her major life activity of working de-
feated her complaint).
208. See Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1249 n.5 (6th Cir. 1985)
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case-by-case basis,2°9 however, the courts' dismissal of cases based on a
lack of evidence prevents a probing empirical analysis of the factors sug-
gested by the EEOC. Therefore, decisions rest on the district court
judge's own subjective determination of what represents a class or broad
range of jobs. 20 This vacuum leaves future courts and employers without
a principled basis for making their decisions.
(citing Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1385-87 (10th Cir. 1981), for
the proposition that plaintiffs must prove that they are handicapped and that the handicap
was the sole reason for their rejection, as opposed to race- or sex-discrimination complain-
ants who need not prove that they are a member of the protected class). It was Congress's
intention that courts construing the ADA look to Rehabilitation Act cases for guidance on
the definition of disability. See Venclauskas v. Department of Pub. Safety, 921 F. Supp.
78, 81 n.1 (D. Conn. 1995) (noting that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act definitions of
"individual with a disability" and "individual with a handicap" are "virtually identical");
Smaw v. Department of State Police, 862 F. Supp. 1469, 1474 (E.D. Va. 1994) (explaining
that the ADA was designed to be interpreted like the Rehabilitation Act). It logically
follows that if courts construing the ADA are looking to the Rehabilitation Act for guid-
ance on interpretation, then they also will use the burden-shifting standard applied by Re-
habilitation Act courts. See Locke, supra note 95, at 114-16 (criticizing the burden-shifting
standard of the ADA that requires a plaintiff to prove first that he is within the protected
class, and then prove that he was discriminated against on the basis of the disability).
209. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1997) (stating that the determination of substantial
limitation should be made on a case-by-case basis); Byrne v. Board of Educ., 979 F.2d 560,
564 (7th Cir. 1992) (implying that courts must determine on an individual basis whether an
impairment is substantial); Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir. 1986) (stating that
the question of who is handicapped is best made by a case-by-case determination); Nedder
v. Rivier College, 908 F. Supp. 66, 74 (D.N.H. 1995) (explaining that a disability claim
must be determined on a case-by-case basis).
210. See supra notes 160-75 and accompanying text (discussing court decisions re-
garding classes and ranges of jobs in Aucutt and Bridges).
211. See Ryan, supra note 205, at 14 (arguing courts have inconsistently interpreted
both the Rehabilitation Act and the Fair Housing Act). For arguments stating that courts
are not only inconsistent, but are misinterpreting the Act altogether, see Locke, supra note
95, at 109 (arguing courts' interpretations are inconsistent with purpose of the statute);
Wilkinson, supra note 22, at 908 (asserting that the judiciary does not understand the stat-
ute, regulations, or disabilities in general). Wilkinson argues that the judiciary often uses
the doctrine of judicial estoppel to dismiss claims when the plaintiff establishes that he is
unable to work because of a disability by holding that he is estopped from claiming that he
is otherwise qualified in spite of that disability. See id. at 915 & n.29. She points out that
this doctrine is typically asserted where an individual is already receiving some type of dis-
ability payment, either through Social Security, ERISA, or Workers' Compensation. See
id. at 916 & n.30. But Wilkinson's point includes its own rebuttal; if the party is able to
receive disability benefits to compensate him because he cannot work, how can he rea-
sonably be expected to perform the essential functions of the job? Furthermore, the statu-
tory benefits he does receive are in place to provide him substitutionary income; thus, he
would not be one of the individuals for whom the ADA was intended because he would
not be outside of the economic mainstream of society. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8)-(9)
(1994) (stating that one of the purposes of the Act is to provide "economic self-
sufficiency" for the disabled). For those who would argue that Social Security Disability,
ERISA, and Workers' Compensation benefits are inadequate, the response has to be that
their claims of dissatisfaction should be directed to those statutes and not the ADA.
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Some of the difficulty for courts may be found in the terms class or
broad range of jobs .2 These terms are not self-defining, but courts still
must use them to evaluate the veracity of a claim of substantial impair-
ment as it relates to working.23 Even the EEOC Compliance Manual, in
an attempt at a clearer definition, merely announced another non-self-
defining term, "narrow range of jobs. 21 4 Because of this failure to define
the terms clearly, judges have rendered their decisions based on their
own personal values or their perception of society's values. 5
The EEOC does provide examples in its Interpretive Guidance to the
regulations implementing the ADA,2 6 but strict use of those examples
would violate the EEOC's own admonition that each court base its de-
termination on the severity of the impairment's effect on the individual,
rather than on the name or diagnosis of the impairment itself. For ex-
ample, in the case of asymptomatic HIV, the EEOC says that this diag-
nosis creates a per se impairment,218 but it may not actually impair any
activity of the individual until the disease begins to manifest symptoms.
21 9
212. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1997).
213. See id. (defining the term "substantially limits" as it relates to working to mean
the inability to perform, compared to the average person with similar training, skills, and
abilities, either a class of jobs or broad range of jobs). This definition, by its silence, leaves
the question of defining a "class" to the court. See Locke, supra note 95, at 118 (arguing
that the EEOC's confusing definitions have forced courts to define the terms).
214. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 902.8(f) (stating that the ability to work is not
substantially impaired by an individual's preclusion from a "narrow range of jobs").
215. See RICHARD V. BURKHAUSER & ROBERT H. HAVEMAN, DISABILITY AND
WORK: THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN POLICY 7-8 (1982) (arguing that the definition of
handicap is a social judgment); tenBroek & Matson, supra note 4, at 814 (arguing that the
"cultural definition" of disability imposes more significant incapacities on the disabled
than their physical impairments). Society imposes, beyond the actual physical impairment,
"aversive responses, and outright prejudices" not unlike the adverse attitudes it often
takes toward "underprivileged ethnic and religious minority groups." Id. at 814; see also
Wilkinson, supra note 22, at 908-10 (criticizing the judiciary for not understanding the im-
plications of most disabilities and thus, only extending coverage to traditional disabilities,
namely "the ones with obvious, severe manifestations").
216. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (1997); supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text
(discussing EEOC examples of impairments that would qualify for coverage as substantial
limitations on the major life activity of working because the impairment excluded the indi-
vidual from either a class or broad range of jobs in various classes).
217. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (explaining that a determination "is not necessarily
based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment ... but ... the effect ... on the life of
the individual").
218. See id. (declaring HIV status to be an impairment and inherently substantially
limiting).
219. See supra note 100 (discussing Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Maryland and the
court's reasoning that HIV status was not a disability because there was no physical im-
pairment).
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Stating that the EEOC's explanations are unclear as to what consti-
tutes a substantial limitation of working, 22 one court looked primarily to
prior case law for guidance.2 21 This solution, however, merely builds
precedent on conclusion, because those earlier courts also made value
judgments based on non-self-defining terms like "narrow range of jobs"
and "class of jobs. 222 Particularly in the case of a lifting restriction, the
courts' refusal to find a substantial impairment, due to their belief that,
the limitation forecloses only a narrow range of jobs, appears to contra-
dict EEOC guidance directly, because the Interpretive Guidance itself
explains that an individual with a lifting restriction would be barred from
a class of jobs. This clear contradiction increases these decisions' vul-
nerability to rejection by other courts on that basis.2U
220. See Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 335 n.10 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The appen-
dix to the regulations is unclear on this point."), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997).
221. See id. at 334-35 (analyzing the holdings of other circuits for guidance on what
qualifies as a substantial impairment in the major life activity of working); see also Welsh
v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1416-20 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that inability to perform
a fireman's job does not represent a substantial impairment); Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212,
215 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that exclusion from a police officer's job did not create a sub-
stantial impairment because it affects only a "narrow range of jobs"). But see Fitzpatrick
v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1126 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating, in dicta, that the job of "fire-
fighter" did represent a class of jobs caused by a substantial impairment); Forrisi v. Bo-
wen, 794 F.2d 931, 935 (4th Cir. 1986) (arguing, in dicta, that an employee's foreclosure
from his chosen occupational field of utility repairman would represent a substantial im-
pairment).
222. See Locke, supra note 95, at 118 (criticizing EEOC regulations as more confusing
than clarifying); see also Bales, supra note 24, at 237-38 (arguing that EEOC regulations
leave crucial questions of interpretation unanswered). Bales contends that the EEOC
failed to prevent employers from relying on "aberrational but discriminatory job [re-
quirements]" as a defense to claims of a substantial limitation of the major life activity of
working. Bales, supra note 24, at 237. This failure occurred because the regulations do
not suggest that courts presume the exclusionary criteria to exist at all area employers us-
ing similar skills. See id. at 237-38. If courts do not presume this exclusion, Bales argues,
employers can say that the individual is only disqualified from one particular job because
of its unique characteristics, and not from either a class or broad range of jobs. See id. at
237.
223. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (explaining that a back condition which bars an in-
dividual from the class of heavy labor jobs would be a substantial impairment of the major
life activity of working).
224. See Frix v. Florida Tile Indus., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1027, 1033-34 (N.D. Ga. 1997)
(contradicting reasoning by courts that held lifting restrictions were not substantial limita-
tions on a major life activity).
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B. The Minority Approach Ignores the Case-by-Case Analysis
Requirement
The court in Frix chose to follow EEOC guidance rather than the
trend in the courts." Nonetheless, the Frix decision presents its own
analytical problems. That court's strict reliance on the example given in
the EEOC Interpretive Guidance represents a failure to analyze the im-
pact of the impairment on a particular plaintiff's ability to continue
working as compared to the average person with similar training, skills,
and abilities. 26 Further, in light of the number of circuits contradicting
the EEOC guidance, it appears unlikely that courts will follow the rea-
soning in Frix.227 Although the trend is to reject lifting restriction dis-
ability claims,2M and employers may rely on that trend for some guidance,
225. See supra notes 176-86 and accompanying text (discussing the court's reasoning in
Frix).
226. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). The Frix court merely performs a syllogism based
on an example in the Interpretive Guidance. First, it finds that the plaintiff was limited to
lifting less than 25 pounds because of a back injury; it then cites the EEOC example of an
individual with a back injury as one who would be excluded from the class of heavy labor
jobs, and thus disabled. See Frix, 970 F. Supp. at 1034. The court concluded that since
Frix had a back injury and worked in a heavy labor job, he was therefore excluded from
that class of jobs and qualified as disabled under the ADA. See id. This process directly
conflicts with the EEOC's requirement that the determination consist of an evaluation of
the impairment's impact on the individual in each case. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20).
227. See Frix, 970 F. Supp. at 1033-34 (noting that an increasingly large number of
courts are finding that lifting restrictions only eliminate individuals from a narrow class of
jobs and, thus, do not substantially limit the activity of working); Locke, supra note 95, at
138 (arguing that courts' fear of excessive plaintiffs' victories, theoretically resulting from
a low threshold of proof, causes them to set a virtually insurmountable hurdle to proving a
substantial limit on the ability to work; Wilkinson, supra note 22, at 908 (arguing court's
misunderstanding of the statute, EEOC regulations, and disabilities causes them to dismiss
meritorious claims); see also Vaughan v. Harvard Indus., Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1340, 1347
(W.D. Tenn. 1996) (holding that heavy labor jobs fall within the class of manual labor
jobs; therefore, to be excluded from a class of jobs, one must be excluded from all manual
labor jobs, not just those requiring heavy lifting); Howard v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp.,
904 F. Supp. 922, 928 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (finding that restrictions on the ability to perform
several manual labor jobs using air wrenches for tightening castings are not a limitation on
a "class of jobs or broad range of jobs in various classes"), affd, 107 F.3d 13 (7th Cir.
1997); cf. Leslie v. St. Vincent New Hope, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 879, 885 (S.D. Ind. 1996)
(stating that evidence of preclusion from a class of jobs or broad range of jobs in various
classes may be shown by the nature of the impairment, without showing any job market
data).
228. See Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir.
1996) (rejecting a 25-pound lifting restriction claim because it did not significantly impair
the plaintiff's ability to perform activities in relation to a person in the general populace);
cert. denied, 117 S. C1. 1844 (1997); Ray v. Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227, 229 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding that, although Ray was restricted in lifting more than 44 pounds, he could still lift
as long as the items were not heavy, and heavy lifting was too discrete a task to qualify as a
major life activity); see also Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311,
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they are still left with the conundrum that those opinions could change
based on a shift in societal values whereby courts, more particularly dis-
trict court judges, do consider a lifting restriction to represent disqualifi-
cation from a class or broad range of jobs.229
III. COURTS SHOULD ATTEMPT TO USE THE EEOC FACTORS WHEN
MAKING ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATIONS, THUS ADDING LEGITIMACY
TO THEIR DECISIONS
Although the EEOC regulations do not define the terms "class of
jobs," "broad range of jobs," or "narrow range of jobs," they do provide
factors which a court "may" use in making a determination. ° Use of
these factors requires a thorough evaluation of the accessible geographic
area,231 the job the individual lost as well as jobs that use similar training,
knowledge, skills, or abilities from which the individual's impairment ex-
cludes him,22 and jobs that do not use similar training, knowledge, skills,
or abilities from which the individual's impairment excludes him.233 A
decision based on a full exploration of these factors in each individual
case would represent a value judgment, rooted in an empirical analysis
based on relevant factors that truly affect the individual's ability to ob-
tain satisfactory employment m not a personal, and oftentimes unin-
formed, judgment subject to changes in societal philosophy.235
1319 (8th Cir. 1996) (concluding that Aucutt's 25-pound lifting restriction was insufficient
to show that his heart condition impaired his "overall employment opportunities").
229. See THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS 10-11 (Robert L. Burgdorf,
Jr. ed., 1980) (arguing that the label of handicap is based on "perceptions of an individual's
role in society"); Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis
and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
413, 426-27 (1991) (citing the shift in societal perceptions toward the disabled "from char-
ity to civil rights" as the impetus for much of the disability discrimination statute move-
ment); Wilkinson, supra note 22, at 915 (discussing the shift in societal perception in the
1960's of the disabled from needing protection and care to needing civil rights).
230. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A)-(C).
231. See id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A); supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the reasonable access factor).
232. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B); supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text
(discussing the similar jobs factor).
233. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(C); supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text
(discussing the dissimilar jobs factor).
234. See Engh, supra note 80, at 163 (arguing that the E.E. Black factor analysis of-
fered the "most useful standard" for determining the existence of a disability); see also
Haines, supra note 20, at 531 (praising E.E. Black as an excellent method for evaluating a
claim of disability).
235. See supra notes 212-15 and accompanying text (discussing EEOC regulations'
lack of clarity and judges' use of personal value judgments to determine disability).
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Perhaps the only change to these factors should be to the sole focus on
an individual's exclusion from jobs because of the impairment."' Rather
than determining what jobs an individual cannot do because of an im-• 2 3 7
pairment, the decision should be based on what an individual can do in
light of his reasonable employment prospects.13' The purpose of the stat-
ute is to bring disabled individuals into the economic mainstream,239 not
240to provide them with rights greater than those of the average person.
This change would not result in the absurd consequences that the dis-
trict court in E.E. Black cautioned against when it rejected the ALI's• 2 4 1
reasoning. The court would still consider the individual's knowledge,
training, skills, and abilities in the decision-making process.242 These fac-
tors would restrain a court from determining that an individual's ability
to perform any job in the geographically accessible area, or, more
broadly, in the entire marketplace, would preclude a finding of a substan-
tial limitation of his ability to work. The court would be forced to con-
sider the individual's investment in professional or vocational training as
suggested in E.E. Black.243 Thus, an unskilled worker with few specific
236. See supra notes 140-57 (discussing the EEOC's factors for analyzing a claim of
substantial impairment of one's ability to work).
237. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B)-(C) (defining factors to consider when evalu-
ating a claim of a substantial limitation on the major life activity of work).
238. See, e.g., McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., 110 F.3d 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1997). The
McKay court held, based primarily on the plaintiff's status as a college student, who was
near completion of her teaching certificate, that her inability to perform repetitive-motion
factory work, caused by carpel tunnel syndrome, was not a substantial limit on her ability
to work. See id. The court reasoned that, because of her education, she was not barred
from a class of jobs or "broad range of jobs in various classes." See id.
239. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(8) (1994) (stating that the "proper goals" of the legislation
should be, inter alia, to provide equal opportunity and economic self-sufficiency).
240. See id. § 12101(9) (finding the need for "opportunity to compete on an equal ba-
sis"). Indeed, the argument may be made that only a general foreclosure from employ-
ment, in vocations somewhat related to the individual's current occupation, would hinder
an employee enough, in comparison to the average person with similar skills, training, and
education, to meet the requirement of a substantial limitation. See Forrisi v. Bowen, 794
F.2d 931, 935 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that a substantial limitation on working means "to
foreclose generally the type of employment involved"); Mustafa v. Clark County Sch.
Dist., 876 F. Supp. 1177, 1180 (D. Nev. 1995) (holding that although impairment may pre-
vent an individual from teaching, it does not bar employment in general). The ADA is
not meant to change the standards applied to claims under the Rehabilitation Act cases.
See Smaw v. Department of State Police, 862 F. Supp. 1469, 1474 (E.D. Va. 1994) (stating
that "[t]he ADA does not create a new avenue for claims").
241. See E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1099 (D. Haw. 1980); supra
notes 42-45 (discussing the court's criticism of the ALl's reasoning in E.E. Black).
242. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B)-(C) (identifying factors a court "may" consider
when determining if an individual is "substantially limited" in his ability to work).
243. See E.E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1101 (arguing that the individual's "own job ex-
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vocational objectives would likely be limited only by his ability to receive
comparable remuneration, benefits, and working conditions.2" On the
other hand, an individual who had invested many years developing a
- 245craft or profession would potentially have more specific expectations.
At this point, an example of this methodology will prove illuminat-
ing.2 Assume an individual is terminated from a position as warehouse
foreman following a back injury that restricts the amount of weight he
can lift to twenty-five pounds. Assume further that this individual lives in
a relatively small city, but one that is not overly remote. Finally, assume
that this individual has a high school education and some experience with
maintaining records at work as well as some rudimentary computer expe-
rience.
In considering this individual's claim, one can determine first that the
reasonably accessible geographic area is not a major barrier to employ-
ment because the impaired individual is not in a remote site. The impor-
tant consideration then would be what jobs he could perform, despite the
fact that he could no longer lift more than twenty-five pounds. The job
he lost was not a profession or a vocation that required a license or other
type of certification. Thus, except for a personal preference on his part
pectations and training" should be considered).
244. See Vaughan v. Harvard Indus., Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1340, 1347 (W.D. Tenn. 1996)
(pointing to the plaintiff's continued employment in numerous manual labor jobs as evi-
dence that he was not substantially limited in his ability to work simply because he could
not perform heavy manual labor); O'Dell v. Altec Indus., Inc., No. 94-6180-CV-SJ-6, 1995
WL 611341, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 16, 1995) (holding that because the plaintiff worked as a
truck driver, machine operator, and a machinist following his disqualification, he could not
show an inability to perform either a "class of jobs or ... a broad range of jobs in various
classes"); Czopek v. General Elec. Co., No. 93 C 7664, 1995 WL 374036, at *2 (N.D. I11.
June 21, 1995) (holding the plaintiff's continued performance of other manual labor jobs
precluded him from showing he was disqualified from a "broad range of manual tasks").
But see Bales, supra note 24, at 236-37 (arguing that unskilled workers are ill-served by
this interpretation because, before obtaining coverage, they must show a greater number
of jobs are unavailable to them than to a highly-skilled worker for highly-skilled workers
will be employed in smaller, but not necessarily narrow, classes of jobs); Haines, supra
note 20, at 546 (noting that even those without "special training" can suffer a "qualitative
employment loss" if they are disqualified from their desired occupation).
245. See E.E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1102 (reasoning that since the position of jour-
neyman required so many hours of training (8000) and the plaintiff had completed such a
substantial portion (3600), it was not unreasonable to consider his preclusion from the pro-
fession of his choice to be a substantial limit on his ability to work); see also Bales, supra
note 24, at 236-37; Haines, supra note 20, at 544; Mayerson, supra note 142, at 509 (arguing
that the ADA does not require employees to prove they would be rejected in more than
one employment setting); supra note 53 (suggesting that a chemist should not be satisfied
with substitute employment as a streetcar conductor).
246. The example is hypothetical, but the facts are based loosely on those from Frix v.
Florida Tile Industries, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1027,1030-33 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
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to remain in his old job, the individual's realistic employment expecta-
tions would be relatively limited. Indeed, viewed through this Com-
ment's framework, the class or broad range of jobs in various classes for
which the individual still is qualified include any jobs that do not require
him to lift more than twenty-five pounds, and offer him similar wages
and working conditions. Considering his predicament in this framework,
a court could reasonably conclude that this individual did not face any
more significant hurdles to securing employment than an average person
and was, therefore, not substantially limited in the major life activity of
working.
Contrast that individual's situation with that of Mr. Crosby in E.E.
Black.247 Mr. Crosby lived on Oahu, Hawaii and, more importantly, had
invested approximately 3600 hours of apprentice training in an attempt
241to become a journeyman carpenter. While Mr. Crosby's reasonable
geographic access might be of some significance, the crucial considera-
tion would be his education, training, and experience. Mr. Crosby had
both a high school and college education2 9 and a court might consider
that he was able, theoretically, to perform most jobs for which college
was a critical requirement. That finding, however, would have to be bal-
anced against Mr. Crosby's significant investment in becoming a jour-
neyman carpenter.250 Mr. Crosby had a reasonable expectation in con-
tinuing to work as a carpenter, and requiring him to find unrelated
employment would, in effect, forfeit his investment. Therefore, he had a
much more viable claim to a substantial limitation on his ability to work
because he had more specific employment expectations, and, in part, be-
cause he produced evidence that supported his claim of substantial limi-
251tation.
Requiring additional evidence to prove a substantial limitation of the
major life activity of working creates a higher threshold of proof for the
plaintiff because he must produce enough economic evidence to show
that he meets the specific ADA standards. Failure to do so would
probably result in the court's ruling against the plaintiff due to a lack of
evidence and for failure of proof.252 At least one commentator probably
247. E.E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1088.
248. See id. at 1091.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See id. at 1102.
252. See Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 727 n.13 (5th Cir. 1995). The
court seemed willing to consider the additional factors provided by the EEOC for evalua-
tion of "working" claims, but ultimately declined to do so based on the plaintiff's failure to
produce evidence regarding those factors. See id.
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would disagree with this requirement because he believes that it places
an additional burden on a plaintiff seeking to bring a claim in an already
too onerous process."3 That criticism, however, ignores the structure of
the EEOC regulations, which permit consideration of the major life ac-
tivity of working only after an individual has failed to prove that he is
substantially impaired in any other major life activity. The major life
activity of working will apply only to those impairments which are too
marginal to receive coverage as a substantial limitation of one of the
other major life activities." The list of major life activities is extensive,
but not exhaustive.2 7 Thus, it is reasonable to require a higher threshold
of proof before allowing a plaintiff to go forward with a claim of being
substantially limited in working, thereby allowing only those truly de-
serving of ADA coverage to come under the statutory umbrella.
253. See Bales, supra note 24, at 239-40 (arguing that a requirement that the plaintiff
present demographic evidence and occupational information is an onerous requirement
for establishing membership in the protected class).
254. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i), 0)(3) (1997) (considering the major life activity of
working separately from other major life activities); id. app. § 1630.2() (explaining that
only if an individual cannot show a substantial impairment of any other major life activity
will he be required to show a substantial limitation of his ability to work in order to obtain
coverage).
255. See id. app. § 1630.2(j) (stating that only when an individual can show no substan-
tial limitation of another major life activity should "working" be considered); EMPLOYEE
RIGHTS, supra note 5, § 3.02(5), at 3-57 (stating that the major life activity of working will
not be considered in "serious mobility impairment" cases, but that the analysis will only
focus on the individual's employability); Locke, supra note 95, at 115 (stating that only
impairments which do not substantially limit "basic life task[s]" are considered under the
working category).
256. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303
(listing the activities of "caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working"); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28
(1990), reprinted in, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989) (same); 29
C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i) (listing the same activities, but also including examples of other
activities that might qualify, such as "sitting, standing, lifting, [and] reaching").
257. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20).
258. See Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986) (arguing that the Rehabili-
tation Act should protect only "truly disabled, but genuinely capable, individuals"). The
Fourth Circuit recognized that congressional intent was to limit coverage to those whose
disabilities were relatively severe when compared with the general population. See id. ("It
would debase this high purpose if the statutory protections ... could be claimed by [an
individual] whose disability was minor and whose relative severity of impairment was
widely shared."); see also S. REP. No. 93-318, at 18 (1973) (stating the need to ensure the
Rehabilitation Act reached those most in need of its services-the severely handicapped);
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, 42 Fed. Reg. at 22,686 (stating that "persons
with the severe handicaps . . .were the focus of concern in the Rehabilitation Act of
1973"); D. Todd Arney, Note, Survey of the Americans With Disabilities Act, Title I: With
the Final Regulations In, Are the Criticisms Out?, 31 WASHBURN L.J. 522, 526 (1992) (ar-
guing that the EEOC regulations extended coverage beyond congressional intent).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The substantial impairment of the major life activity of working is not
defined adequately in the regulations implementing the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990. Courts considering these cases generally have
been hesitant to find a disability. They have defined "working" broadly,
rejecting most claims as not foreclosing an individual from a class of jobs
or broad range of jobs, but concluding that the individual is barred only
from a narrow range of jobs. The courts have relied heavily on plaintiffs'
failure to produce evidence adequately supporting their claims, and have
simply concluded in the absence of facts that the impairments did not
qualify for statutory coverage. This broad-brush approach, although rep-
resenting a majority view, does not rest upon principled, empirical analy-
sis, but rather on the personal value judgments of a majority of district
court judges. Accordingly, employers continue to find themselves with-
out a reliable method by which to assess their conduct and to ensure
compliance with the statutory requirements. The EEOC has set forth
factors in its Interpretive Guidance that would allow a court to use em-
pirical analysis and reach principled decisions. Requiring plaintiffs to
produce the evidence needed to evaluate those factors is consistent with
congressional intent. Although use of these factors may not resolve close
cases easily, it will provide a more reasoned foundation on which courts
faced with ADA claims in the future may base their decisions.
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